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SUMMARY
Since the first observation of antineutrinos from beta decay of the fission
products inside a nuclear reactor in 1956, the design and operating experience of
antineutrino detectors near reactors has increased to the point where monitoring the
reactor’s power level and progression through its burnup cycle has become possible.
With the expected increase in world nuclear energy capacity, including the dissemi-
nation of reactor technologies to non-nuclear states, the need for safeguards measures
which are able to provide continuous, near-real-time information about the state of
the core, including its isotopic composition, in a tamper- and spoof-resistant manner
is evident. Near-field ( 20 m from the core) antineutrino detectors are able to fulfill
this demand without perturbing normal reactor operation, without requiring instru-
mentation which penetrates the reactor vessel, and without displacing other plant
structures.
Two sodium-cooled long-life fast reactors that are characteristic of next-generation
reactors which are attractive for installation in non-nuclear states, one large and one
small power rating, have been modeled throughout their reference burnup cycles using
MCC-3 and DIF3D/REBUS. Various diversions of fissile material from the core de-
signed to obtain weapons-usable material for the purpose of nuclear proliferation were
studied as perturbed core states. The difference in detector event rates between the
reference and perturbed states was used to determine the probability that a particular
diversionary activity would be apparent before the material could be converted into
a weapon. These data indicate which types of diversion antineutrino safeguards are
particularly strong against and how the technology might be implemented in current




1.1 Nuclear power expansion
The expansion of nuclear power generation in the nuclear states is a key element in the
reduction of carbon emissions originating from those nations. However, with many
non-nuclear states on the cusp of rapid industrialization and economic expansion,
the gains made in emissions reduction by the nuclear states could be more than
outstripped by the increase in these developing nations[22, 34, 26]. These states,
which will soon need large-scale electricity generation for the first time in their history,
represent an enormous energy market into which the nuclear industry would like
to expand; the low operating cost of nuclear power and the emphasis on modular
design of the Gen-IV reactors[6] are attractive features which make such an expansion
mutually beneficial.
A rapidly rising portion—35% as of 2005—of the human population lives in
freshwater-scarce regions[31], and desalination plants offer the ability to purify brack-
ish and sea waters to mitigate shortages[42]. Nuclear energy is a good candidate for
supplying process heat in desalination plants because the waste heat shed through
tertiary cooling loops is at the ideal temperature for these processes[37]. This heat
must be shed to facilitate safe reactor operation, and would normally be sent to the
plant’s ultimate heat sink; it is essentially free to use.
In developed economies there is increasing incentive and means to adapt the elec-
tric grid to smooth out its daily load cycle across all 24 hours[21]. A large part of
this incentive is due to the shift to electric cars which are both most efficiently and
conveniently charged at night when grid load is low[16]. Implementation of a smart
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grid which uses energy storage technologies at both the grid and residential scales
can also more evenly distribute the load[21]. The transition to a load cycle with less
variation can take maximum advantage of the high economic efficiency provided by
base load generation via nuclear power.
However, a prime barrier to the expansion of nuclear power in general, and in non-
nuclear states in particular, is the propensity for the distribution of nuclear material
and technology to result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons[26, 10].
1.2 Proliferation concerns
Because nuclear energy requires the development of either the capability to enrich ura-
nium, obtain and reprocess spent (plutonium-bearing) fuel, or the use of heavy-water-
or graphite-moderated reactors which use natural uranium fuels with low burnup at
discharge (and therefore relatively weapons-usable plutonium), it is beneficial from
a non-proliferation perspective to have fuel cycle states (those with such capability
already established) provide reactor facilities and fabricated fuel directly to a user
state, potentially in turnkey format, and to take back spent fuel for reprocessing or
disposal[59]. Doing so allows for expanded nuclear energy capacity without increasing
the number of actors with the technology required to produce either highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or weapons-usable plutonium. Nonetheless, the use—as intended—of
uranium in a nuclear reactor unavoidably generates 233U and/or 239Pu in situ. Even
with the most proliferation-resistant format of nuclear energy expansion, the supplied
material must still be accounted for during its time in the user state. Any expansion
of nuclear energy production, under any format, must therefore be accompanied by
robust safeguards and transparency of nuclear plant operation and nuclear material
transfer and use.
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1.3 Current safeguards regime
Currently, nuclear materials are reported by each nation possessing them to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which then verifies the reported amounts,
locations, and uses through sampling, on-site inspections, and checking operations
records. For reactor fuel, the combination of the reactor power history and visual
identification of the unique stamped number on each assembly, as well as checks for
broken seals indicating unauthorized access are the main methods used to ensure that
the reported values are accurate[17]. However, since these inspections have signifi-
cant periods of time between them and are vulnerable to spoofing, several weeks may
elapse between a successful diversion and its discovery. Depending on the readiness
of the actor performing the diversion to use the material, the discovery may well be
too late to prevent its use; for plutonium obtained from current forms of spent fuel,
the estimated time for conversion to a weapon is 1-3 months, and for low-enriched
uranium (LEU) it is 3-12 months[23]. The amount of each material that constitutes
one significant quantity (SQ) is 8 kg for plutonium from irradiated fuel and 75 kg
of 235U in LEU[23]. These quantities can be obtained via removal of a few fuel as-
semblies from a commercial power reactor. For some diversions, a single assembly is
enough—highlighting the necessity of high sensitivity in the application of safeguards
technologies.
1.4 Development of antineutrino detectors for safeguards
As the number of nations engaging in nuclear energy use grows and the fuel cycle be-
comes more complex and internationalized, the stresses on the safeguards infrastruc-
ture will only increase[60]. Two of the most valuable qualities which new safeguards
technologies can possess are the capability for always-on, real-time monitoring and
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the integrity of the data provided. There are proposed operator-independent monitor-
ing methods employing near-core (∼ 20 m) antineutrino detection which are always
on and approach real-time, limited by the time required to obtain sufficiently fine
statistics to discern between reactor states[9]. The use of an always-on monitor in-
dependent of the reactor operator, in addition to observing the current reactor state,
offers the benefit of verifying the operating history itself, and thereby placing an
upper bound on the amount of fissile material generated[12, 8].
1.4.1 Safeguards-relevant properties of antineutrinos
Nuclear reactors produce a copious electron antineutrino (ν̄e) flux which results from
the β− decay of the fission fragments (Equation 1). On average, approximately six
such decays occur per fission; at ∼ 200 MeV released per fission, there are O (1020)
antineutrinos generated per second per GWth.
A
ZX → AZ+1 Y + β− + ν̄e (1)
Because the fission product distribution varies slightly depending on the isotope
fissioned and, to a lesser extent, the neutron spectrum in the reactor, the antineutrino
flux and energy spectrum is dependent upon the fission rates of each isotope in the
reactor (Figure 1). Using this dependence and a known initial fuel composition and
reactor neutron spectrum, it is therefore possible to produce a reference detector signal
which should occur as a function of burnup[13] and compare the measured signal to
determine if there is substantial deviation in either magnitude or spectrum which
would indicate that a diversion of fuel has taken place, even if it has been replaced
by a reactivity-equivalent substitute intended to spoof other means of detection.
Despite the extremely low interaction cross section (less than 10-40 cm2) of neutri-
nos with matter, such a large antineutrino flux results in a sufficient detection rate for
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Figure 1: Antineutrino yield per fission per MeV for four primary isotopes (data
provided by Patrick Huber, May 13, 2014) with (inset) cumulative fission product
yields for the four primary isotopes (data compiled from JENDL FP Fission Yields
Data File 2011).
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application to reactor monitoring[8]. In fact, the low cross section renders them effec-
tively unshieldable, thus providing an extremely transparent window into the reactors
operating status without requiring the radiation-hardened electronics necessary for
in-core instrumentation.
1.4.1.1 Tracking of reactor power changes
As the origin of the reactor’s antineutrino flux is the decay of its fission products, the
intensity of the reactor antineutrino source is directly proportional to its power—or,
more precisely, the residual decay heat in the core. The core decay heat drops by an
order of magnitude in ∼ 3 hours following a full shutdown[46], allowing for hour-scale
determination of the off/on status of the reactor and hour- to day-scale determination
of a change in its operating power. This capability was demonstrated experimentally
for a commercial thermal reactor with the SONGS-1 detector[8].
1.4.1.2 Tracking evolution of core fissile makeup with burnup
SONGS-1 also demonstrated the ability of 1 m3-scale antineutrino detectors to effec-
tively monitor the makeup of a reactor with known initial conditions as it progressed
through its burnup cycle[13]. The primary driver for burnup-induced change in a
reactors antineutrino spectrum is the gradual shift from fissioning 235U to fissioning
bred-in 239Pu; the former yields more antineutrinos per fission, and has a harder
antineutrino spectrum.
Furthermore, analysis performed by P. Huber[15] indicates that, had the tech-
nology existed at the time, a slightly larger (several m3) antineutrino detector could
have provided crucial information on the core loading and operational history of the
DPRK test reactor which was used to produce weapons-grade plutonium and which
was hastily disassembled immediately prior to the arrival of International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in order to obscure such information.
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1.4.1.3 Oscillation
Over reactor-detector standoffs relevant to single-plant antineutrino safeguards, os-
cillation of the flavor to mu or tau is negligible[2, 3], so the antineutrino flux reaching
the detector is virtually identical to the one generated by the fission products, with
only inverse-square geometric attenuation affecting its magnitude. The small deficit
from full survival probability in flight from source to detector is the same for both the
reference and nearly any perturbed-state reactor antineutrino spectrum, so difference
calculations such as the ones performed when comparing reference and perturbed
states will substantially mitigate the miniscule error incurred by ignoring oscillation.
1.4.1.4 The inverse beta decay reaction
The most mature technology for detecting electron antineutrinos relies on the inverse
beta decay (IBD) reaction[58]:
ν̄e + p→ e+ + n (2)
This reaction has a cross section on the order of 10-43 cm2 and a threshold energy
of 1.8 MeV which reduces the number of detectable antineutrinos produced per fission
to approximately 1.92 for 235U and 1.45 for 239Pu[28]. The cross section for the IBD
reaction as a function of energy shown in Figure 2 overlaid with a typical spectrum
per fission event. The difference in detection rate between the two primary fissile
isotopes present in most reactors is illustrated in Figure 3.
The IBD reaction does not occur for neutrinos; therefore sources of neutrinos
are automatically excluded from detectors which use this method, thus reducing the
background event rate. This property is particularly valuable for reactor monitoring
purposes: reactors produce almost exclusively antineutrinos and the proton chain
in the sun produces exclusively neutrinos; therefore detectors which use the IBD
reaction automatically exclude solar neutrinos (since they, like antineutrinos, cannot
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Figure 2: Detection spectrum (a) of reactor antineutrino flux spectrum (b) due to
the energy dependence of the IBD cross section (c).
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Figure 3: Product of IBD cross section and reactor antineutrino spectrum for 235U






THE ROLE OF ANTINEUTRINO SAFEGUARDS IN
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
Antineutrino detectors of varying size and range offer the hope of monitoring nuclear-
related activities including covert use of declared reactor facilities, operation of clan-
destine reactors, and remote detection of detonations. These capabilities shape its
incorporation into both the enforcement of current treaties and agreements as well
as the language and scope of future nonproliferation-related documents. While de-
tection of clandestine reactors and nuclear detonations requires large-scale construc-
tion of detector networks with efficiency and background rejection exceeding current
technology, near-field monitoring of declared reactors via small, on-site detectors is
attainable in the near term [7]. Their safeguards relevance is limited to plutonium-
based weapons, however, as their measurement requires a large antineutrino source
such as an operating reactor—they would not be able to detect a uranium enrichment
facility regardless of proximity. Bernstein et al [7] identify three areas of research into
near-field reactor monitoring necessary to promote inclusion within a comprehensive
safeguards regime:
1. Safeguards Analysis R&D, primarily the efficacy of monitoring non-PWR re-
actor types and combination of antineutrino-based data with other safeguards
information,
2. R&D toward sensitivity gains of the detectors themselves, including detector
efficiency improvements and background rejection as well as modeling of the
antineutrino source behavior and reduction in uncertainty, and
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3. R&D that facilitates deployment of detectors.
To address some of these needs, reactor antineutrino sources which have fuel cy-
cle behavior markedly different than the LWR’s used in experiments demonstrating
the capabilities of near-field monitoring have been chosen. In particular, they are
reactor types which may see deployment to non-nuclear states and therefore repre-
sent a unique proliferation vector. The historical and policy context of such reactor
deployments and their monitoring is observed.
2.1 Current and proposed nuclear nonproliferation policy
2.1.1 Nonproliferation Treaty
Historically, the fear of nuclear weapon proliferation has been the driver of multi-
ple international treaties and agreements, the most sweeping of which is the Non-
Proliferation Treaty[53] (NPT). The NPT recognizes the right of nations to pursue
nuclear technologies for peaceful applications, provided no effort is made to acquire
or develop the capability to deploy nuclear weapons, while simultaneously directing
those nations which had acquired nuclear weapons prior to ratification or accession
to reduce their stockpiles of weapons and ultimately to fully disarm.
The success of the NPT depends to a high degree on the ability of international
bodies to monitor nations production, use, and disposal of nuclear material; currently
this is done in a declaration-verification scheme in which each nation declares its
stores, transfers, operational records, etc., and these are checked against data gathered
by inspectors deployed to declared sites[53]. In this way, nations adherence to the
NPT or demonstration of a lack thereof is established through snapshots of their
nuclear program. These can also be taken together with tracking and accounting on
secondary goods which could be used to construct and operate non-declared facilities
to establish limits on the level to which a nation may be subverting the NPT.
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Antineutrino detectors operated as near-field reactor monitors would provide ex-
clusion of proliferation paths which include removal of plutonium from a reactor.
If combined with the exclusion of enrichment facilities operating on uranium above
a particular enrichment, the reactor’s inventory is protected against weaponization
while within, as any uranium diverted from the reactor’s core would require subse-
quent enrichment to achieve weapons-usable material.
2.1.2 Plutonium management and disposition agreement
In service to the disarmament pillar of the NPT, the United States and the Rus-
sian Federation signed the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement[54]
(PMDA). The PMDA dictates the timeline for the disposal through fissioning of
weapons-grade plutonium left over from previous dismantling of the nuclear stock-
piles of the US and former USSR. Both are planning on blending the plutonium with
uranium to form mixed oxide (MOX) fuels; the US, with its lack of a large-scale
fast reactor fleet, will use its MOX fuel in light water reactors, while Russia plans
to use its high-power-rating BN-series fast reactors to accomplish the same task[19].
Although each still maintains an appreciable nuclear arsenal, the recent cooling of
US-Russia relations may present a scenario in which one or both parties might prefer
to re-deploy higher warhead counts. The necessity of the ability of each party to
continually verify, without assuming the deployment of an inspection team, that the
fuel loaded into the reactors slated for disposal missions contains the correct amount
of blended weapons-grade plutonium should not be underestimated.
2.1.3 Fissile material cutoff treaty
The proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, opposed primarily by Pakistan [32],
would seek to place a cap on the amount of separated weapons-grade material each
nation may possess, thereby placing an upper limit on the rate at which an arsenal
may be accumulated. While most of the enforcement of such a treaty would, logically,
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occur at the used fuel storage and reprocessing facilities, a way of circumventing such
measures includes alteration of reactor inventory so as to reprocess material at a
clandestine facility. Continuous verification of reactor inventories via antineutrino
detection would provide assurance that plutonium slated to remain in a reactor until
discharge does so without requiring extremely frequent inspections, the intrusiveness
are a key sticking point in opposition to such a treaty [44]. The non-intrusiveness
to normal operations of which antineutrino detectors are capable and restriction to
plutonium, while not excluding uranium-based weapons, may provide a mechanism
to limit at least some forms of further proliferation by weapons states. Pakistan has
indicated in the past that it would consider a bilateral agreement with India to such an
end [32], and if one were to be drawn up, parts of it might look similar to the PMDA in
terms of verification mechanisms with respect to antineutrino monitoring—assurance
that the initial core inventory is sufficiently close to what is declared and that it
remains in the core for the declared burnup.
2.2 Lasting consequences of peaceful transfer
While the NPT has been generally successful at preventing large-scale proliferation
of nuclear weapons across the glove, past provisions of nuclear equipment and tech-
nology for ostensibly peaceful purposes have resulted in steps toward weaponization.
Optimism in any peaceful deployment to a non-nuclear state must be tempered by the
reality that equipment which can be repurposed toward producing a nuclear weapon
and the knowledge to use it tend to last much longer than the governments to which
they are provided, whether that turnover is due to normal operation of a nation’s
governing process or a more revolutionary event. Both Iran and the DPRK were
provided with nuclear technology in a manner not dissimilar from currently proposed
provisions of reactors for power generation.
14
2.2.1 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
To date, there has been only one instance of withdrawal from the NPT, when the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) acknowledged that it had used a test
reactor and spent fuel processing facility to produce and weaponize plutonium[53].
The DPRK has had four successful nuclear tests, in 2006, 2009, 2013, and most re-
cently, on January 6th, 2016. The most recent detonation was claimed by the DPRK
to have been a thermonuclear device[40], although the resulting seismic activity (5.1
on the Richter Scale) was about an order of magnitude less severe than known un-
derground thermonuclear tests[55] and was more similar to that of previous DPRK
tests, suggesting that either the device was actually a boosted fission bomb or that the
fusion stage did not achieve its intended increase in total bomb yield. Atmospheric
sampling in the coming weeks will be needed to provide information on the level
of fusion reactions which actually took place. Regardless of the type of device, the
continuation of nuclear testing combined with missile development implies that de-
vice miniaturization with the aim of ballistic missile armament is one of the DPRK’s
ambitions.
2.2.2 Iran
Iran, in a situation that mirrors some of the beginning of the DPRK withdrawal from
the NPT and subsequent proliferation, has taken steps toward obtaining uranium-
based nuclear weapons capability using a combination of declared facilities and clan-
destine facilities (most notably uranium enrichment at Fordrow). The most significant
difference between the DPRK nuclear timeline and that of Iran is the willingness of
Iran to negotiate away from its prior move to easily weaponizable material, thus in-
creasing its breakout period—the minimum time necessary to finish developing and
building a weapon—and culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion (JCPOA) [18] between Iran and the P5+1 (the UN permanent security council
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members plus Germany).
Iran’s nuclear program began under the Atoms for Peace [36] program in 1957,
when the nation was considered a US ally, and entailed the provision of LEU fuel and
technical assistance by the US. This approach strongly resembles proposed provider-
user framework for nuclear energy in non-nuclear states, and demands caution that
facilities installed under such a framework cannot be assumed to be accessible to inter-
national inspection teams indefinitely. The termination of amicable US-Iran relations
with the 1979 Iranian revolution and the context in which its nuclear program was
initiated are relevant to any proposed construction of nuclear facilities in non-nuclear
weapons states.
The recent events surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, the negotiations, and the
subsequent JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 give some indication into what in-
ternational safeguards bodies consider an “acceptable” breakout period for a country
with a history of sparring with the IAEA and in possession of technical experience
related to delivery systems for nuclear warheads.
In addition to dismantling most of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure and
eliminating its stockpile of uranium on the cusp of 20% 235U, the JPCOA requires Iran
to submit discharged fuel for disposal, thus precluding the acquisition of a plutonium
weapon via reprocessing irradiated fuel. However, since there are at least several
months between consecutive core discharges, the need for more frequent verification
of the core inventory is necessary. Should the integrity of the core inventory be
compromised between discharges, it would provide immediate information regarding
the completeness of Iran’s declared facilities—as they would not risk detection to
divert material without the propensity to use it before the next discharge.
The measures taken in the JPCOA have increased Iran’s estimated breakout time-
line from a few months to over a year, likely longer for plutonium-based weapons[35].
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Supposing that one year represents an acceptably short confirmation time that safe-
guards attempts have failed—whether the indication is through determination that
nuclear material has been diverted or through detection of a test detonation—, tech-
nology which allows such a determination for at least some modes of nuclear material
diversion prior to one year after the fact should be of value to safeguards entities.
Even should Iran disable monitoring technology as late as possible to buy time, the
installation of continuous monitoring apparatus would thereby provide warning that
clandestine efforts were underway prior to seismic readings after detonation and allow
a chance at preventing the acquisition of a weapon. Safeguards analysis of antineu-
trino detectors which would fulfill a continuous monitoring purpose has been extended
past the standard three month conversion period for plutonium sourced from irradi-
ated fuel to a full year of reactor operation in order to assess their value in this
context.
2.3 Advantages of antineutrino monitoring
The prospect of using antineutrino detectors to produce a continuous, if statistically
complicated, image of an operating reactor’s inventory has numerous advantages pro-
moting inclusion to some degree in nuclear safeguards. The primary motivating fac-
tors for inclusion of antineutrino technology in verification of nonproliferation policy,
some of which have already been mentioned in discussion, are the continuous nature
of the provided information and the non-intrusiveness of its ascertainment. Real-
time information is provided which bridges the knowledge integrity gap in the time
between in-person inspections. In addition to the obvious advantages of possessing
continuous information, this may be used with a focus on the integrity of knowledge
of certain facilities to guide efficient inspection team deployments. Detectors which
are always-on but removed from the reactor vessel provide a less-intrusive monitoring
mechanism to verification efforts that may provide an additional tier of policy action
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on the part of nations that lies between allowing and disallowing IAEA inspection
teams to enter a country. Tiered enforcement may be written to take advantage of
this if a sufficient distinction can be achieved.
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CHAPTER III
SOURCE AND DETECTOR CASE STUDIES
3.1 Reactor antineutrino sources
Because of the proliferation concerns with fast reactor deployment, there has been
significant effort spent designing fast reactors with proliferation-resistant features.
Among the most widely adopted of these are the elimination of blanket zones and
the use of non-oxide fuel forms which are capable of high burnup and are resistant to
diversion during reprocessing. Some designs are built with a once-through fuel cycle
in mind which fissions the fuel to very high burnup over several years, even multiple
decades, at the end of which the spent fuel is not reprocessed. These designs are
very attractive for deployment in non-nuclear states specifically because the reactor
vessel does not need to be opened for any reason other than maintenance during the
intervening years. The near-elimination in refueling logistics increases reactor uptime
and saves money, but more importantly, removes pathways for diversion of material
during refueling or transit.
In order to sustain critical operation for such a long time, however, these de-
signs almost universally contain blanket or very low-enrichment zones in which fissile
plutonium is bred to offset depletion of the initial fissile loading. Because the fast
neutron spectrum has relatively low capture/fission ratios across all of the actinides,
but particularly in 239Pu, the bred plutonium can remain weapons-grade for years.
Therefore, real-time monitoring is particularly desirable for these designs to ensure
that nuclear material has not been diverted during a maintenance shutdown, which
will inevitably occur. Two reactor designs which bear these characteristics—one with
19
a small power rating and one with a large rating more in line with the current com-
mercial fleet—have been chosen for the role of reactor antineutrino source.
3.1.1 UCFR-1000
The UCFR-1000[51], the design for which was developed by the Ulsan Institute of
Science and Technology (UNIST) in conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL), has been selected as the large, high-power-rating core. The UCFR-1000 is a
U-10Zr-fueled core with a low-enriched uranium (LEU) starter zone on top of which
sits a 300 cm fertile region containing natural uranium. During operation, the burn
zone propagates upward at about 5 cm/year as plutonium is bred into the fertile zone
and depleted fuel is left behind, consistent with the CANDLE[47] burnup scheme.
It is intended to operate on a once-through cycle which lasts 60 years at full power.
The major core parameters, taken from the design paper, are shown in Table 1, and
the core layout, assembly cross-section, and axial enrichment zoning are shown in
Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6, respectively.
An additional motivation for choosing the UCFR-1000 is that the axial progression
of the burn zone causes the geometric attenuation of the antineutrino flux to slowly
change—opening the door for use of relative signal strength among multiple detectors
to track progression once the core has completely transitioned to burning 239Pu is
complete.
Due to the very large heavy metal inventory of the core, removal of nuclear ma-
terial which yields 1 SQ of plutonium will constitute a sub-1% change in total HM
inventory, and depending on the location from which material is obtained, may change
slightly more or less than this fraction of the fissile isotope inventory. Since, in prac-
tice, antineutrino detection resides firmly in the regime of poor counting statistics,
discrimination of such small changes is quite difficult and requires many-day count
integration periods. This is one of the primary challenges with respect to detecting
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Table 1: Parameters of the UCFR-1000 core.
Parameter Value (293 K)
Power rating (MWth/MWe) 2600/1000
Cycle length (Effective Full-Power Years) 60
Fuel form U-10Zr
Initial HM loading (t) 201
Specific power density (MW/t) 12.9
Volumetric power density (W/cm3 81.0
# Fuel assemblies 378
Assembly pitch (cm) 16.5
Fuel pin diameter (cm) 1.49
Fuel smeared density (cm) 74.5
Uranium enrichment of driver/blanket (%) 12.3/Natural
Active core height (cm) 360




















Figure 4: Layout of the assemblies in the UCFR-1000. Reflector assemblies are in







Figure 5: Cross-cut view of a UCFR-1000 fuel assembly (to scale).
partial-core diversions. The low magnitude of the change in fuel is offset somewhat
by the UCFR’s high thermal power rating.
3.1.2 AFR-100
The AFR-100[30], developed at ANL, has been chosen for the small, low-power-rating
fast reactor design; it is a 250 MWth sodium cooled fast core designed for a 30-year,
once-through cycle. The major parameters of the AFR-100 are provided in Table 2,
and the core layout is shown in Figure 7.
The AFR-100 shares the assembly and pin design cross section (Figure 5) with
the UCFR-1000, but instead of a tall core with distinct starter and fertile regions at
the beginning of cycle, the AFR-100 has the more traditional pancaked geometry of
fast reactors. To achieve a balanced coolant exit temperature and power distribution,
it has an onion-type enrichment scheme (Figure 8) which propagates the burn zone
from the periphery of the reactor toward the center. The propagation is symmetric,
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Figure 6: UCFR-1000 fuel, reflector, and assembly axial zoning.
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Table 2: AFR-100 core parameters.
Parameters Values (293 K)
Power rating (MWth/MWe) 250/100
Cycle length (EFPY) 30
Fuel form U-10Zr
Initial heavy metal inventory (t) 24.64
Number of fuel assemblies 150
Assembly pitch (cm) 16.5
Fuel pin diameter (cm) 1.49
Fuel smeared density (%) 75
Core average enrichment (%) 13.47
Active core height (cm) 110
Figure 7: Layout of the assembly types in the AFR-100.
much slower, and the effect much less pronounced than in the UCFR-1000, primarily
due to the small core volume, but also the more gradual enrichment differences. The
change in geometric attenuation of the antineutrino flux is negligible.
One of the primary constraints for the design of the AFR-100 was that it must
fit in a small core barrel (3.0 m diameter). This constraint resulted in the inclusion
of only one layer each of reflector and shield assemblies. To avoid excessive radiation
damage to the reactor vessel and core support structures, the traditional B4C shielding
material was mixed with ZrH1.6 in order to enhance neutron moderation. Softening

























Figure 8: Enrichment zoning of the LEU starter fuel for the AFR-100.
in 10B, as well as reducing the damage per neutron which interacts in structural
materials. The improved shielding comes at the cost of slightly reducing the albedo
of the combined reflector+shield.
The AFR provides challenges for safeguards via antineutrino detection in essen-
tially the opposite manner of the UCFR. The small core volume means that a 1-SQ
removal represents a much higher fraction of the total core heavy metal inventory, eas-
ing discrimination. This is countered by the order of magnitude lower power rating,
and therefore antineutrino source strength, of the reactor. In addition, the conver-
sion from 235U to 239Pu is less drastic since the “low” enrichment zone is still 8% 235U




The choice of detector was motivated by the desire to keep to near-field antineutrino
detector experience so as to not extrapolate too egregiously upon the capabilities of
detectors which would be installed at the earliest a few years from now. This excluded
the physics experiments geared toward solar and stellar neutrino characterization and
more toward oscillation experiments, many of which use commercial-scale nuclear
reactors as their source of pure electron antineutrinos. A new focus in neutrino
oscillation physics in the search for a sterile neutrino is near-field behavior of the
antineutrino flux emitted from a reactor; to achieve very short baselines, test reactors
are being used as sources. The few-meter separation from a test reactor has the
added bonus of providing a high detector event rate that will help further improve
precision on antineutrino yields from the fissions of some isotopes, particularly 235U,
since many test reactors are fueled with HEU and therefore fission almost exclusively
this fuel isotope from initial loading to final discharge.
3.2.1 PROSPECT
A detector based heavily on the Phase-I (AD-I) and Phase-II (AD-II) detectors for
the PROSPECT project[5] has been adopted for antineutrino safeguards calcula-
tions. The PROSPECT detectors are slated to deploy in the High Flux Isotope Re-
actor (HFIR) in late 2016 (AD-I) and 2019 (AD-II) with the objectives of precisely
measuring the HFIR antineutrino spectrum, searching for short-range neutrino oscil-
lation via motion of AD-I along a track that spans distances of 7-12 m from the core,
and probing for eV-scale sterile neutrinos[5]. The safeguards-relevant parameters of
PROSPECT AD-I and AD-II are provided in Table 3.
Multiple prototypes in increasing sizes similar to AD-I and AD-II have previously
been constructed by the PROSPECT team in order to test proof-of-concept, detector
properties, and backgrounds. Various shielding materials and configurations have
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Table 3: PROSPECT AD-I and AD-II parameters used for the basis of the safeguards
detector, obtained from [5].
Parameter Value
Antineutrino Detector I (AD-I)
Proton density 5.5e28 No./m3
Total target mass 2940 kg
Fiducialized target mass 1480 kg




Signal:Background (near, far) 3.1, 1.8
Closest distance to core (near, far) 6.9 m, 9.4 m
Antineutrino Detector II (AD-II)
Total target mass ∼ 10 ton
Fiducialized target mass ∼ 7 tons
Signal:Background 3.0
Closest distance to core 15 m
resulted in a multi-layer shield consisting of water bricks, polyethylene (some of it
borated), and lead bricks. The final shielding volume is approximately 1/4 of the
AD-I volume[5].
3.2.1.1 Segmentation
The PROSPECT antineutrino detectors are segmented into rectangular prisms mea-
suring approximately 15 cm × 15 cm × 120 cm, which are mounted in a grid with
pitch based on their width. Between each segment is an optical divider; the remain-
ing interstitial space is used to house calibration sources and to run fiber optic cables
which carry signals from the adjacent segments[5]. Segmentation allows for segment-
scale position resolution within the detector. This data can be leveraged to reduce
background relative to a similarly-sized, non-segmented detector by giving the power
to reject particles which interact over several segments based on directionality. The
use in concert, of what are essentially an array of very small antineutrino detectors,
improves the signal to background ratio to above unity[5].
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3.2.1.2 Scintillator
Many previously-developed near-field antineutrino detectors have used Gd-doped wa-
ter as the scintillation medium[12, 8, 13]; 157Gd is stable and absorbs thermal neutrons
with a cross section of about 255000 barns[14]. However, it does so via an (n, γ) reac-
tion, and the resulting photon has E = 7.9 MeV, high enough that it would frequently
deposit its energy across several segments. Therefore, another isotope was sought to
act as a neutron capture agent in order to provide the characteristic positron-neutron
coincidence behavior of IBD.
The EJ-309 liquid scintillator developed by Eljen Technology[52] was chosen by
the PROSPECT team. This xylene-based compound was doped with 6Li to capture
the low-energy neutron released in the IBD reaction. 6Li has a very high neutron ab-
sorption cross section—on the order of thousands of barns for thermal neutrons[14]—
and the reaction products are heavy nuclei which deposit their energy over a very
short range (< 1 mm):
n+6 Li→ α + t+ 4.78 MeV (3)
3.2.1.3 Synergy with antineutrino safeguards
The deployment timeline of both phases of PROSPECT is shorter than the expected
inclusion of antineutrino safeguards into new reactor facilities (approx. 10 years). De-
tector operation experience will contribute heavily toward further development and
deployment of antineutrino detectors for safeguards purposes—indeed, one stated
purpose of PROSPECT is to provide safeguards-usable data—as well as expand the
knowledge of short-baseline neutrino physics which might affect the expected detector
signal in normal operation and in diverted-material cases. AD-I and AD-II will pro-
vide very high-quality data on the 235U component of the reactor antineutrino flux[5]
at safeguards-relevant baselines.
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The AD-II detector is similar to the simulated safeguards detector both in size and
placement relative to the reactor and surface. Developments introduced for Phase II
of PROSPECT and the assumptions and estimations made by the PROSPECT team
for AD-II have been taken into account when making judgements on the capabilities
of the safeguards detector and the environment in which it operates.
3.2.2 Detector placement
The SONGS-1 antineutrino monitoring experiment[12, 8, 13] used otherwise unoccu-
pied space in the tendon gallery for commercial PWR observations. In the spirit of
remaining unobtrusive to normal reactor operation, the detectors are placed as close to
the core as possible without requiring special consideration during plant construction,
resulting in locations within the containment building but outside the chamber con-
taining the reactor pressure vessel, guard vessel, etc. For commercial-scale PWR’s,
this approach usually results in a standoff of 20-25 m from the center of the core.
Sodium-cooled fast cores are much more compact per unit power than PWR’s, but
prevailing designs use a large pool-type reactor vessel to provide additional thermal
inertia during transient events.
Because the UCFR-1000 is a (very) preliminary design and there are no commercial-
scale fast reactors in existence designed for decades-long burnup cycles, there is no
available information on specific dimensions of a potential UCFR containment build-
ing. The core compactness and pool-type vessel sizing should roughly offset, so a
standoff of 25 m is assumed for UCFR-1000 monitoring based on the SONGS-1 stand-
off from a reactor with similar power rating. It is possible that improvements in fast
reactor experience prior to final design of a CANDLE-type reactor with a large power
rating will result in a reduced vessel radius given the time between now and earliest
possible deployment, but standoff reduction of more than about 5 m is unlikely due
to physics-based safety considerations.
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The AFR-100 is a much more mature design, and therefore effort has been put
into designing its containment building, cooling systems, etc.; the plant layout plan
for the AFR-100 allows detector placement approximately 17 m from the core center
[29]. The AFR standoff serves as a soft validation of the 25 m estimate for the UCFR.
Three PROSPECT-like segmented antineutrino detectors will be symmetrically
arranged around a circle with a radius of the minimum unobtrusive standoff to esti-
mate the performance of an antineutrino detector suite. If necessary to distinguish
such a particular arrangement in the discussion of named detectors from another
established detector or project, the suite will be referred to as RETINA (Reactor
Evaluation Through Inspection of Near-field Antineutrinos), although it should be




3.3.1.1 Focus on plutonium
Preliminary analysis using a coarse-grained model of the UCFR-1000 indicated that
the diversion of 1 SQ of LEU (75 kg of 235U in LEU) from a freshly loaded core, with
replacement of natural uranium, would be unable to be detected within the weapon
conversion window (< 12 months) via near-field antineutrino safeguards. The exceed-
ingly small change in the isotopes undergoing fission resulted in a nearly-identical
antineutrino flux. Furthermore, the uranium acquired would be 12.3% enriched, re-
quiring significant further enrichment in order to yield HEU that is weapons-usable (>
90% 235U). A nation possessing the enrichment capacity to bring the stolen uranium
to the required enrichment would likely have other more easily executed methods
of obtaining the required material—whether through procuring uranium under the
guise of overt peaceful use or through black market channels. The limited utility
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of antineutrino safeguards against LEU diversions from LEU-fueled fast reactors in
addition to the availability of other acquisition methods for the material motivates a
focus on diversions of plutonium.
3.3.1.2 Plutonium amount and purity
The plutonium inventory of fast reactor assemblies which are not initially loaded with
reactor-sourced plutonium has the quality of remaining relatively devoid of contam-
inant isotopes (240Pu, 238Pu, fission products, etc.) for a long time after one SQ has
accumulated in the assembly. In order to offset losses during processing and avoid the
possibility of acquiring too little material, diverting actors will attempt to maximize
the amount of plutonium obtained. In the likely event that the entity using the ma-
terial is still testing aspects of their nuclear capabilities, multiple-SQ diversions are
more probable endeavors. However, since these represent larger changes to the core
fissile inventory, most of the diversions considered are of the order of 1 SQ to scope the
limits of antineutrino safeguards technology. Since diversions for use in radiological
weapons can be almost arbitrarily small in terms of plutonium mass removed, only
diversions with a lower bound of one SQ of plutonium are considered.
Contaminant effects offer an upper bound on material irradiation for consider-
ation as prime targets for assembly-level diversion. The primary contaminant for
plutonium-based nuclear weapons is 240Pu because its large spontaneous fission rate
greatly increases the chance of fizzling and reduces the energy release during deto-
nation. Although kiloton-scale detonations are estimated to be possible with plu-
tonium containing 15% 240Pu by using very sophisticated implosion and boosting
techniques[43], the generally used demarcation for identifying plutonium as weapons-
grade is the inclusion of less than 7% 240Pu, so that will be used as a criterion for
selecting diversions. All 239Pu-containing plutonium is considered “direct use mate-
rial” by the IAEA[23] unless it contains over 80% 238Pu, rendering its heat generation
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prohibitive to further processing. As plutonium born of reactor-irradiated uranium
only contains at most a few percent 238Pu, this restriction will not apply when se-
lecting diversions. The radiotoxicity induced by the accumulation of fission products
in irradiated nuclear fuel is not considered here to be a limiting factor to a deter-
mined actor which may have access to adequate shielding, since fission products are
chemically separated out during reprocessing. However, less-contaminated fuel is con-
sidered “more attractive” since the acquisition of shielding and equipment and the
construction of facilities designed to make use of highly radiotoxic material is itself a
vector for potential discovery by authorities.
3.3.1.3 Remaining undetected
Time-integration of the detector signal can be performed by the monitoring agency
for arbitrary start- and end-points, but the weapon conversion times defined by the
IAEA[23] provides a reasonable limit of three months after the occurrence of material
diversion for detection. Simulation of a core perturbed by a diversion will continue up
to a year after the diversion in order to provide quantification of the extent to which
the technology must be improved to catch near misses and to identify replacement
scenarios that result in a subcritical core—an obvious indication that something is
awry.
To facilitate remaining undetected as long as possible, diversions are selected
which constitute removal of a single assembly or a few assemblies which are not co-
located. Keeping the removal to at most a few percent of the total number of fuel
assemblies—378 in the UCFR and 150 in the AFR—minimizes the relative change
in core fissile inventory. The removal of many assemblies also necessitates propor-
tionally larger shielding, logistics, and reprocessing efforts, giving more time for the
diversion to be detected prior to deployment of a weapon. When multiple assembles
are removed, they are assumed to be distributed as widely as possible across the core.
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Nuclear reactors operate in a highly non-linear problem space, and the effects of local
flux hotspots/depressions and neutron spectrum shift which further alter the per-
turbed vector of fissioning isotopes are pronounced when the replacement assemblies
are more tightly coupled.
In all reactors, there are areas of higher and lower neutron importance. Removal
of an assembly in a high-importance region will more substantially affect the reactor
than removal of a less important assembly. For fast reactors, the higher incidence of
neutron leakage from the core usually means peripheral assemblies are less important.
The flat enrichment scheme of the UCFR-1000 yields a zero-order Bessel function
radial flux shape, confirming the lower importance of peripheral assemblies. In the
AFR-100, the enrichment scheme has been devised to minimize this effect for control
rod worth reasons[30], but the inward migration of the burn zone, faster depletion
of the fissile material in the edge assemblies, and decrease in leakage factor through
the cycle indicate that peripheral assemblies lose neutron importance and the central
assembles gain it as burnup increases.
3.3.1.4 Early availability
A single-assembly diversion will be considered for both reactors which represents
the first instance of one SQ of plutonium becoming obtainable via removal of one
assembly. This is done as a measure of the decrease in breakout period caused by
installation of a long-life fast reactor facility in a non-nuclear weapons state. With
fairly few accumulated fission products, removing these assemblies also constitutes
some of the easiest-handled irradiated material, especially compared to late-cycle
diversions. If the actor is able to replace the diverted material with an LEU-bearing
replacement assembly, it will most closely approximate the removed one (fissile isotope
mostly 235U, few fission products) for early-cycle diversions.
33
Table 4: UCFR-1000 diversion scenarios















b Assemblies 1, 12, 23, 34, 45, 56 Natural Uranium
3.3.1.5 Testing at the limits of near-field antineutrino safeguards
In order to assess the limits of near-field antineutrino safeguards, diversions will focus
on removals of one SQ of plutonium from the most peripheral assemblies where it is
available and at the shortest irradiation time for which it is present. Replacement
assemblies are assumed to be manufactured to be structurally and materially identical
to the removed assemblies, including the use of reduced-activation and low-swelling
steels. Although it is a near-certainty that these would be exceedingly difficult to
obtain, machine, and use undetected in a timely manner, the focus is on the change
in heavy metal inventory, so opening the door to a myriad of replacement possibilities
which may require the operator to change zoned cooling, single control-rod position,
etc., are beyond the scope of this evaluation.
3.3.2 UCFR-1000 diversion cases
The set of diversions considered for the UCFR-1000 are outlined below in Table 4.
3.3.2.1 UCFR-1a and UCFR-1b
Diversions UCFR-1a and UCFR-1b represent the earliest point at which 1 SQ of
plutonium is available via removal of a single assembly from the UCFR-1000. This





















Figure 9: Location (red) of the diverted & replaced assembly for diversion scenarios
UCFR-1a and UCFR-1b.
as these are the locations of highest flux. The plutonium vector is given in Table 5,
and the assembly location is shown in Figure 9. The plutonium obtained via these
diversions is not far from the 7% threshold of 240Pu contamination.
3.3.2.2 UCFR-2a and UCFR-2b
Diversions UCFR-2a and UCFR-2b represent a patient actor who only needs one SQ
and can reasonably wait until enough plutonium is available via diversion of a single
corner assembly in order to select one with a low probability of being caught. The
plutonium vector is given in Table 6, and the assembly location is shown in Figure 10.
The plutonium is somewhat purer than that obtained from the UCFR-1a and UCFR-
1b diversions due to the lower flux, and since the irradiation rate is about 15% as high,
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Table 5: Plutonium vector for an assembly in Ring 2 of the UCFR-1000 at a burnup
of 2.17 EFPY (diversions UCFR-1a and UCFR-1b).
Isotope Mass (kg) % of total
238Pu 3.08× 10−2 0.38
239Pu 7.53 93.04
240Pu 5.07× 10−1 6.26
241Pu 2.47× 10−2 0.31
242Pu 1.08× 10−3 0.01
Total 8.10
Table 6: Plutonium vector for a corner assembly (position 1) in Ring 12 of the UCFR-
1000 at a burnup of 12.42 EFPY (diversions UCFR-2a and UCFR-2b).
Isotope Mass (kg) % of total
238Pu 1.82× 10−2 0.23
239Pu 7.55 93.95
240Pu 4.49× 10−1 5.59
241Pu 1.77× 10−2 0.22
242Pu 6.49× 10−4 0.01
Total 8.04
the concentration of surviving fission products is lower, potentially easing shielding
requirements.
3.3.2.3 UCFR-3a and UCFR-3b
These diversions are essentially the same as UCFR-2a and UCFR-2b, but scaled up
to include all corner assemblies, representing an actor who either needs more material
or is willing to accept increased risk of detection in order to arm several weapons.




















Figure 10: Location (red) of the diverted & replaced assembly for UCFR-2a and
UCFR-2b.
Table 7: Plutonium vector for all corner assemblies in Ring 12 of the UCFR-1000 at
a burnup of 12.42 EFPY (diversions UCFR-3a and UCFR-3b).


























Figure 11: Locations (red) of the diverted & replaced assemblies for UCFR-3a and
UCFR-3b.
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Table 8: AFR-100 diversion scenarios















b Assemblies 2, 16, 30 Natural Uranium
3.3.3 AFR-100 diversion cases
The AFR-100 does not breed one SQ of plutonium into every assembly by the end
of its burnup cycle; the chosen diversion scenarios instead focus on obtaining one SQ
of plutonium via removal of one, two, and three assemblies that are either available
as early as possible (scenarios 1a/b) or at the core periphery (scenarios 2a/b and
3a/b). The AFR-100 diversions are summarized in Table 8. For the scenarios with
LEU replacement, the total fissile enrichment (235U + 239Pu + 241Pu) present in the
removed assembly at the time of diversion was rounded to the nearest integer percent
to determine the 235U enrichment each of the replacement fuel assembly macrozones.
While a dedicated and sophisticated actor may be able to achieve greater precision in
fuel fabrication, the returns on doing so are small compared to using LEU as opposed
to natural uranium.
3.3.3.1 AFR-1a and AFR-1b
The flatter flux distribution, lower local power density, and lack of true blanket assem-
blies keeps one SQ of plutonium from being obtainable via a single-assembly diversion
in the AFR-100 until 15.75 EFPY into the burnup cycle. At this burnup, three of
the center-adjacent assemblies (the core has 2π/3 rotational symmetry) host one SQ
of weapons-grade plutonium. The plutonium obtained at this point is described in
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Figure 12: Location (red) of the diverted & replaced assembly for AFR-1a and AFR-
1b.
Table 9, and the location of the withdrawn assembly is shown in Figure 12. The 235U
enrichment of the AFR-1a replacement assembly is 15% in the lower and upper fuel
macrozones and 9% in the middle.
3.3.3.2 AFR-2a and AFR-2b
If a proliferator has access to an AFR-100 core late in its burnup cycle and is able
to simultaneously divert two assemblies, 1 SQ can be obtained from the assemblies
Table 9: Plutonium vector for a center-adjacent assembly in the AFR-100 at a burnup
of 15.75 EFPY (diversions AFR-1a and AFR-1b).
Isotope Mass (kg) % of total
238Pu 2.50× 10−2 0.31
239Pu 7.56 93.93
240Pu 4.47× 10−1 5.55
241Pu 1.62× 10−2 0.20
242Pu 6.12× 10−4 0.01
Total 8.05
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Figure 13: Locations (red) of the diverted & replaced assemblies for AFR-2a and
AFR-2b.
at the edge of the core, where they will disturb the neutron flux distribution the
least and provide the greatest chance of remaining undetected. Diversion scenarios
AFR-2a and AFR-2b represent this situation. The plutonium obtained has superior
purity to that from the center-adjacent assemblies obtained in scenarios AFR-1a/b,
although the burnup (21.25 EFPY) is several years later in the cycle, so deploying
an AFR-100 would not grant a proliferator a short breakout period in which they
remain undetected for over two decades. The plutonium obtained from each of the
two assemblies in these scenarios is described in Table 10, and the locations of the
withdrawn assemblies are shown in Figure 13. The 235U enrichment of the AFR-2a
replacement assemblies is 14% in the upper and lower fuel macrozones and 13% in
the middle.
3.3.3.3 AFR-3a and AFR-3b
If a proliferator wishes to act sooner than the timeline available in scenarios AFR-
2a/b but has the capability to simultaneously remove three assemblies, the assemblies
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Table 10: Plutonium vector for each of two peripheral assemblies in the AFR-100 at
a burnup of 21.25 EFPY (diversions AFR-2a and AFR-2b).
Isotope Mass (kg) % of total
238Pu 6.05× 10−3 0.15
239Pu 3.91 97.00
240Pu 1.13× 10−1 2.80
241Pu 2.02× 10−3 0.05
242Pu 3.78× 10−5 < 0.01
Total 4.03
Table 11: Plutonium vector for each of three peripheral assemblies in the AFR-100
at a burnup of 13.25 EFPY (diversions AFR-3a and AFR-3b).
Isotope Mass (kg) % of total
238Pu 2.19× 10−3 0.08
239Pu 2.62 98.15
240Pu 4.68× 10−2 1.75
241Pu 5.79× 10−4 0.02
242Pu 6.84× 10−6 < 0.01
Total 2.67
at the core edge can provide 1/3-SQ of plutonium at 13.25 EFPY. The plutonium
obtained by doing so (Table 11) is firmly in the “supergrade” category regardless of
which definition—usually at least 95%-98% 239Pu—is used. The assembly locations
for these diversions are shown in Figure 14. The 235U enrichment of the AFR-3a
replacement assemblies is 14% throughout the active fuel region.
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REACTOR MODELING METHODS, CALCULATION OF
ANTINEUTRINO SOURCE AND DETECTOR SIGNAL,
AND QUANTIFICATION OF UNCERTAINTY
4.1 Reactor modeling
The reactors were modeled using the Advanced Reactor Code (ARC) system devel-
oped and packaged by ANL. The ARC system is designed to quickly and accurately
calculate various aspects of fast reactor neutronics, fuel cycles, and transient sce-
narios using high-fidelity deterministic solutions to the neutron transport equation.
Its outputs are used to construct the antineutrino source which is incident upon the
detector chosen for the case studies.
4.1.1 Lattice cell calculations
Lattice cell calculations were carried out in MC2-3, a multigroup cross section code
which uses cross section libraries and a simplified reactor geometry to produce spatial-
and energy-self-shielded effective cross sections for use in full-core neutronics calcula-
tions. Effective cross sections are necessary for deterministic solutions to the transport
equation because solution-by-calculation methods do not automatically account for
alterations to the neutron spectrum due to the presence of strongly interacting nu-
clei. In contrast, solution-by-demonstration methods such as Monte Carlo reactor
simulations estimate these effects by simply executing the simulation.
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4.1.1.1 Macro-zones
Traditionally, lattice cell calculations are carried out on a single reactor element of
dimensions comparable to the neutron mean free path—this is usually a single fuel
pin in thermal reactors and a fuel assembly in fast reactors. Reflective boundary
conditions are enforced to simulate the leakage from and to adjacent elements which
should, in reality, have nearly a identical composition, neutron spectrum, etc. A
calculation is performed for each type of reactor cell since the neutron spectra in the
fuel, blanket, reflector, shield, etc., will tend to differ significantly. While relatively
efficient, the approximations required in the traditional become suspect near interfaces
between different
A different approach which takes advantage of the increased computation power of
modern machines and the long mean free path of neutrons in a fast reactor was taken
with respect to representation of the various element types. Instead of only consid-
ering each lattice cell type in isolation, the reactor is divided into macro-zones over
which material compositions and temperatures are averaged. These are then assem-
bled within a simplified reactor geometry with cylindrical symmetry that preserves
mass. By considering the arrangement of the macro-zones during the lattice cell cal-
culations, leakage from one macro-zone to another is allowed to influence the effective
cross sections. In addition, the macro-zone approach provides a consistent method for
accommodating large-scale changes in flux distribution and fuel composition which
may occur during burnup, particularly in ultra-high-burnup designs.
The macro-zone layout for the AFR-100 is dictated by the enrichment zoning
(Figure 8). An additional lateral cut across the core mid-plane was made to restrict
the temperature rise across any particular fuel macro-zone to about 50 K. The result-
ing zone structure has 4 axial sections of each of the inner, middle, and outer core
assembly types, totaling 12 macro-zones.
In order to avoid imposing massive computational costs every time microscopic
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cross sections need to be calculated, the total number of macro-zones in the UCFR-
1000 is kept to 12. The flat enrichment scheme across the starter zone necessitates
two radial sections to account for the Bessel-shaped radial flux distribution, and axial
divisions are made every 60 cm up the fuel column such that the bottom inner and
outer axial macro-zones contain the starter fuel and the rest contain sections of the
fertile column.
4.1.1.2 Ultra-fine group calculation and condensation to broad group structure
The ultra-fine group (UFG) calculation was performed using ENDF-VII cross section
libraries and the ANL2082 group structure. The neutron spectrum and self-shielded
UFG microscopic cross sections were first estimated in each macro-zone via a 0-
D (traditional) lattice cell calculation. These estimated UFG cross sections were
then refined in the approximate RZ geometry described in the previous section. The
TWODANT neutron flux solver was used to provide an S12 UFG flux solution with
a maximum mesh spacing of 5 cm. This flux was used to produce self-shielded UFG
cross sections and then to collapse the cross sections down to broad groups (ANL33
Structure) in preparation for full-core neutronics calculations.
4.1.2 Full-core neutronics and fuel cycle
Full-core calculations were carried out using VARIANT to supply high-fidelity neutron
flux distributions in the ANL33 group structure obtained by solving the neutron
transport equation via variational nodal methods. VARIANT has the advantage of
retaining real assembly-level geometry (Hex-Z), but must use homogenized (smeared)
compositions within each assembly mesh. Sub-assembly spatial fidelity is able to be
partially retained by using the flux shape functions which are the minima of the
variational nodal calculation. The flux distribution was used to deplete the fuel in
the REBUS (Reactor Burnup System) code, which solves the Bateman Equations
for the isotopes of interest in the reactor. Fuel isotopes from 233U (Z = 92, N = 141)
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through 245Cm (Z = 96, N = 149) were considered ”of interest”, as outside these
bounds the concentrations and reaction rates are exceedingly small for a uranium-
fueled fast reactor. Fission products were lumped according to the parent isotope
undergoing fission and assigned averaged neutronic properties weighted by relative
yield. Fissions of fuel isotopes above 241Pu were lumped together because of their
small individual concentrations.
The size of the depletion steps used to map the fuel cycle for each reactor was
based on the relative power density in each reactor and the time scale over which
diversions of interest would be evaluated. The AFR-100 has a low power density
for a fast reactor (58.2 kW/L, compared to ∼300 kW/L for a typical SFR), so step
size was set at 1/4 EFPY since this is the weapon conversion time for reactor-sourced
plutonium. The UCFR-1000 has a listed power density approximately 30% higher
than the AFR-100, but because the power is produced in a small fraction (∼1/6) of
the core volume at any one time, 1/12-EFPY steps were used instead. The smaller
step size also helps limit error in the flux distribution used to deplete the fuel that is
introduced by motion of the burn zone.
4.1.3 Mid-cycle cross section updates
During early simulations of the UCFR-1000 burnup cycle, it became apparent that
significant error was being introduced by using the BOC effective cross sections for
the whole cycle. The factors causing this were twofold: motion of the burn zone
causes the spatial flux distribution to change throughout the cycle, and conversion
from burning 235U to 239Pu alters the relative magnitudes of cross section resonances,
exacerbating early-cycle errors. These factors are much more significant in the UCFR-
1000 than in the AFR-100 because the latter experiences a much smaller change in
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Figure 15: Calculation scheme used to map the fuel cycle of the AFR-100 and UCFR-
1000. Rectangles indicate codes which perform the duties described within; ovals are
data sets, with gold denoting user-defined data and grey denoting calculated data.
4.1.3.1 Update calculation scheme
In order to facilitate periodic updates to the effective microscopic cross sections, a
script was written which averages the fine-grained fuel isotope data from the REBUS
outputs at a particular interval across the spatial macro-zones. The entire lattice
cell calculation process is repeated for each mid-cycle concentration, and the updated
effective microscopic cross sections are recombined with the fine-grained isotope con-
centration data and used to continue fuel cycle calculations until the next update is
required. Frequent updates are computationally expensive, so the interval between
updates was kept to approximately the duration required for the burn zone peak to
move from one axial mesh to the next. The calculation scheme for the fuel cycle
mapping, including the actions required when updating the effective cross sections,
is outlined in Figure 15.
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4.1.3.2 UCFR update comparison
Because the rate of divergence between the UCFR fuel cycle data should be most
pronounced during the beginning of the cycle, metrics from the first 15 EFPY were
used to assess the case for periodic updates to the effective microscopic cross sections.
Updates were performed every 1 EFPY, during which the burn zone propagates by
at most about ∼5 cm (half the z-mesh used for region differentiation). The differ-
ence in the reactor eigenvalue, keff, illustrates the scale of the difference for integral
effects (Figure 16). While the eigenvalues track each other for the first 3 EFPY, the
burn zone propagates more quickly thereafter as fissile material is burned out of the
starter region. The ∼1 EFPY separation between the local minima indicates a slower
burn zone speed in the non-updated case. By 15 EFPY, the updated-case eigenvalue
asymptotes, as one would expect from a flux distribution that moves upward into fer-
tile material, depletes it as it moves through, and leaves behind material increasingly
laden with reactivity poisons. In contrast, the non-updated case eigenvalue diverges
from the expected asymptotic behavior. Under-predicting the reactor eigenvalue in-
dicates an under-prediction of reactions with fissile isotopes and an over-prediction
of reactions with non-fissile isotopes, most notably 238U since it comprises the bulk
of the fuel.
In addition to integral effects, neglecting to update effective cross sections also
introduces a great deal of error into metrics which are of prime interest in nuclear
safeguards. The inaccuracy in the plutonium inventory (Table 12) of the reactor by
10 EFPY into the cycle on the scale of 1 SQ—the same as the amount taken in some
of the diversion scenarios.
The difference between the data indicate that periodic updates to the effective
microscopic cross sections are necessary to ensure accuracy of the fuel cycle output
data. For the reference fuel cycle, cross sections will be updated every 1 EFPY from
0 to 15 EFPY, then every 3 EFPY for the remainder of the cycle. The relaxed update
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Figure 16: Comparison of the reactor eigenvalue for the UCFR-1000 between the fuel
cycle simulations with updated and non-updated effective microscopic cross sections.
Table 12: Difference in the plutonium inventory between the updated and non-
updated UCFR-1000 data.
5 EFPY 10 EFPY
Isotope Diff(kg) % Diff(kg) %
238Pu −0.02 −0.35 −0.11 −0.73
239Pu 2.54 0.25 6.97 0.45
240Pu −0.37 −0.43 −2.13 −1.00
241Pu −0.09 −1.69 −0.44 −2.44
242Pu −0.01 −1.36 −0.05 −2.21
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Figure 17: Comparison of the reactor eigenvalue for the AFR-100 between the fuel
cycle simulations with updated and non-updated effective microscopic cross sections.
schedule past the first quarter of the burnup cycle is only possible because by that
point the burn zone is propagating slowly upward and the change in fuel isotopes is
slow compared to at BOC.
4.1.3.3 AFR update comparison
The AFR-100, contrary to the UCFR-1000, has very little difference between fuel
cycle data resulting from periodic (every 3 EFPY) updates to effective microscopic
cross sections and that resulting from a never-updated simulation. The burn zone
motion is minute by comparison, and conversion from fissioning 235U to 239Pu is slower
and of lower magnitude. The reactivity never varies more than 40 pcm during the
cycle, and the keff curves lie on top of one another (Figure 17).
Similarly, the fission rates of the primary power-producing isotopes never varies
by more than 0.2%, with 235U and 239Pu staying within 0.1% until the last 5 EFPY of
the burnup cycle. The difference of each as a function of burnup is shown in Figure 18.
51
Burnup (EFPY)

























Figure 18: Comparison of the reactor eigenvalue for the AFR-100 between the fuel
cycle simulations with updated and non-updated effective microscopic cross sections.
The lack of significant difference between the non-updated and updated cases
indicates that mid-cycle updates to the effective microscopic cross sections are un-
necessary for the AFR-100 fuel cycle mapping.
4.2 Construction of the antineutrino source and detector sig-
nal
4.2.1 Reactor antineutrino source
4.2.1.1 Building the source at reference points from antineutrino yield
The antineutrino yield data which comprise the non-reactor input to the antineu-
trino source calculation are aggregated from multiple experiments and theoretical
beta decay calculations. Nearly all of the compiled experimental data to date on
antineutrino yields from nuclear fission is the result of thermal fission of the pri-
mary isotopes responsible for power production in thermal reactors: 235U, 239Pu, and
241Pu. The bulk of these data comes from measurement of the beta decay spectra
associated with fission of these isotopes at the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) research
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reactor [45, 57, 25, 56]. These measurements have been incorporated with an ab ini-
tio prediction which sums the contributions to the electron antineutrino flux from
the individual beta decay pathways of the various fission products [33]. Recently,
integral measurements for the antineutrino yield resulting from 238U fission have been
made [24] which generated data in a similar manner to that provided by the ILL mea-
surements. To date, these are the only yield values which incorporate experimental
measurement of fission product beta decays.
The yields and their uncertainties over the range of reactor antineutrinos mea-
surable by inverse beta decay for the primary fissioning isotopes, compiled from Hu-
ber [27] for 235U, 239Pu, and 241Pu and Haag et al. [24] for 238U are in Table 13. The
spectrum has been divided into 0.5-MeV wide energy bins; data with 250-keV binning
has been weighted according to the antineutrino yield per fission.
The nominal antineutrino yields for the isotopes without experimental data, pack-
aged into 0.5-MeV energy bins, were provided by Huber [27]. Aggregated with the
ILL and Haag experimental results into a yield matrix Y, these are used to calculate
the nominal antineutrino spectrum (Eq. 4) emitted by the reactor with fission rate
vector f at a particular burnup:
S = Yf (4)
4.2.1.2 Fitting event rate curves to span burnup cycle
Equation 4 provides the instantaneous reactor antineutrino source in each energy bin
for all of the depletion steps in each reactor’s fuel cycle. However, the timescale during
which irradiated fuel can be converted to a weapon is similar to the gap between
depletion steps. Therefore, although the reactor antineutrino source changes quite
slowly, it is helpful to express the source in each bin as a function of burnup. Fitting
smooth curves to the data also adds the capability to extrapolate or interpolate
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Table 13: Nominal antineutrino yields and errors (primary isotopes). The tabulation
starts at 2 MeV because of the 1.8 MeV energy threshold of the IBD reaction. Values
marked with * were estimated from fitting curves to the available yield uncertainty
data.
ν̄e Energy (MeV)
235U (#/fission/MeV) 1σ (%) 238U (#/fission/MeV) 1σ (%)
2.0 1.198 1.8 1.372 18.5 *
2.5 8.643× 10−1 1.9 1.047 9.2*
3.0 6.302× 10−1 1.9 8.002× 10−1 4.7
3.5 4.403× 10−1 2.0 5.882× 10−1 4.3
4.0 3.005× 10−1 2.1 4.217× 10−1 4.2
4.5 1.891× 10−1 2.4 2.795× 10−1 4.4
5.0 1.186× 10−1 2.6 1.831× 10−1 5.0
5.5 7.331× 10−2 2.8 1.183× 10−1 5.9
6.0 4.231× 10−2 3.2 7.111× 10−2 8.3
6.5 2.311× 10−2 3.5 4.089× 10−2 12.3
7.0 1.195× 10−2 3.9 2.237× 10−2 15.0
7.5 5.077× 10−3 4.8 1.079× 10−2 29.8
8.0 1.959× 10−3 6.4 4.650× 10−3 49.1 *
8.5 6.743× 10−4 7.2 1.987× 10−3 50.0 *
9.0 2.696× 10−4 9.2* 9.947× 10−4 50.0 *
ν̄e Energy (MeV)
239Pu (#/fission/MeV) 1σ (%) 241Pu (#/fission/MeV) 1σ (%)
2.0 1.028 2.6 1.199 2.5
2.5 7.286× 10−1 2.6 8.839× 10−1 2.3
3.0 5.159× 10−1 2.8 6.420× 10−1 2.4
3.5 3.388× 10−1 3.2 4.359× 10−1 2.5
4.0 2.146× 10−1 3.5 2.872× 10−1 2.6
4.5 1.207× 10−1 4.6 1.675× 10−1 3.3
5.0 6.882× 10−2 4.9 9.893× 10−2 3.5
5.5 4.057× 10−2 5.6 6.033× 10−2 3.8
6.0 2.198× 10−2 7.9 3.350× 10−2 4.8
6.5 1.105× 10−2 9.9 1.741× 10−2 5.7
7.0 5.289× 10−3 13.1 8.772× 10−3 6.2
7.5 2.020× 10−3 21.4 3.589× 10−3 8.4
8.0 7.279× 10−4 28.4 1.375× 10−3 11.7
8.5 2.268× 10−4 29.0 5.199× 10−4 13.0
9.0 8.106× 10−5 35.9 * 2.249× 10−4 16.9 *
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diversion results, if necessary, based on the discrete data. The smoothness of the
burnup dependency and the monotonically increasing or decreasing evolution of the
fuel isotopes allows accuracy with a relatively low-order polynomial fit; the large
excess of data points over fit coefficients ensures that little error is introduced during
fitting. A 4th order polynomial proved sufficiently precise, and because time is a
reasonable proxy for burnup, the nomenclature for time dependence was used in lieu
of adding yet another ”b” to subscripts or function arguments.
4.2.2 Detector event rates
The expected burnup-dependent event rate nb (t) in each bin b at each depletion step
is a function of the burnup-dependent reactor source Sb (t) in that bin, geometric
attenuation, number of target protons Nd in the scintillation medium, and the bin-
averaged IBD cross section σIBDb and intrinsic efficiency εb. The background term Bb




σIBDb εbSb (t) +Bb (5)
4.2.2.1 Background
The PROSPECT team undertook extensive site-specific background characterization
throughout the development of their AD-I and AD-II detector designs[4]. The main
backgrounds for the IBD reaction with a reactor antineutrino source are reactor-
correlated neutron and gamma fields which result from capture and scattering of the
neutron flux in the reactor, coincident uncorrelated γ events originating in surround-
ing bedrock/soil, and cosmogenic fast neutrons which downscatter and subsequently
capture in the 6Li-doped scintillator. Measurements during prototyping indicated
that passive shielding and time-, energy-, and position-based cuts, including pulse-
shade discrimination and fiducialization, were sufficient to reduce the uncorrelated
and reactor-correlated backgrounds to negligible levels[5]. The reactor-correlated
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background, negligible for the PROSPECT team at ∼ 7 m from a test reactor, should
be at least as low for more distant installations near a power reactor that does not
require perforations in shielding to allow for experimental equipment, etc.
The remaining IBD-like background due to cosmogenic neutrons was modeled by
the PROSPECT team for the AD-I detector and compared to data gathered by one
of the latest prototypes, PROSPECT-20. The data showed very good agreement
well past the energy range considered for safeguards[5]. The passive shielding for
other background sources in combination with reactor building features and Earth’s
atmosphere provide attenuation of cosmogenic neutrons which is not appreciably
better than surface-level estimates of the cosmogenic fast neutron flux[5].
The variation due to altitude and depth of reactor installation are the primary
factors which would decrease the cosmogenic flux. These vary enough from site to site
that the AD-I background is used for background estimation without assuming any
additional overburden from below-grade placement of the detector which would put
it in the plane of the core. AD-II is to be sited 1 floor below AD-I, and will therefore
experience slightly lower cosmogenic flux, and it is expected to achieve at least as
good a signal-to-background ratio as AD-I[5]. The simulated safeguards detector,
whose placement resembles PROSPECT AD-II to a high degree, will therefore use
the AD-I background estimates as a conservative indicator of the background at a
generic reactor site with the note that it would be reduced somewhat via below-grade
placement or for sites close to sea level.
Estimation of the post-cut HFIR background data and uncertainties for the PROSPECT
project[5] was performed via close-range (< 20 cm) optical techniques. The result-
ing data was shifted by the detector prompt ionization energy (1.293 MeV) to align
with incident antineutrino energy and re-binned to match the energy structure used
for safeguards calculations. The estimated data and resulting safeguards background
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event rates due to cosmogenic fast neutrons are shown in Figure 19. The rates in Fig-
ure 19b are linearly scaled up to account for the higher fiducial mass of the safeguards
detector (5 tons, compared to ∼ 1.5 tons for AD-I).
Prompt ionization [MeV]

























(a) Estimations PROSPECT AD-I back-
ground, recreated from Ashenfelter et al.[5].
Prompt ionization [MeV]





























(b) Background for safeguards calculations,
converted and rebinned from the data in (a).
Figure 19: The estimates of PROSPECT AD-I background due to cosmogenic fast
neutrons was used to approximate the background for antineutrino safeguards appli-
cations.
4.3 Quantification of Uncertainty
The uncertainties affecting the comparison calculation between the antineutrino sig-
nal from reference and perturbed reactor states arise from the following elements of
the calculation: reactor physics uncertainty σrp, antineutrino yield uncertainty σyields,
detector parameter uncertainty σdet, reactor operating power uncertainty σpower used
for diversion masking, and the fitting errors for the burnup-dependent evolution of the
calculated nominal reference and perturbed detector event rates σfit,ref and σfit,div.
These are combined in quadrature to produce the parameter σnorm in the χ
2 goodness-
of-fit calculation (Equation 13). Each uncertainty element may have multiple com-
ponents, and for the reactor physics uncertainty these components show significant
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4.3.1 Reactor physics uncertainties
The uncertainty on the reactor antineutrino source arising from the model of the
reactor and its burnup cycle is propagated through the calculated isotopic fission
rates (Equation 7). The antineutrino yield matrix Y is also the array of partial
derivatives of the source with respect to each fission rate.
∆SR = Y (Σ (F)) Y
T (7)
The fission rates are determined only by the initial-state reactor compositions, the
microscopic cross sections for each interaction, the reactor thermal power, and the
operating history of the reactor. The approach to propagating uncertainty on each of
these as fuel depletion proceeds becomes complex due to the significant correlation and
anti-correlation introduced through the imposition of a total thermal power output
for the reactor. Because the energy release per fission varies only slightly between
isotopes, a fission of one species almost exactly offsets one of another species. This
trade-off in fission rates is compounded by the mutual exclusivity of the various
reaction paths (inducing fission, radiative capture, inelastic and elastic scatter, n-2n,
and other reactions) any given neutron can take. For example, an under-predicted
238U capture cross section bears many similarities to an under-predicted 239Pu fission-
to-capture ratio because 238U begins the plutonium production chain. However, it
will quicken the burnout of 235U since there is less plutonium available to produce
power, whereas an over-predicted 239Pu capture cross section will alter the fission
rates of plutonium species relative to one another without impacting the share of
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reactor power from plutonium fissions as significantly. This leads to significant non-
diagonality in the fission rate covariance matrix Σ (F).
4.3.1.1 Monte Carlo method for estimating fission rate uncertainties
With the rise in computing power and information storage, a Monte Carlo approach
can be taken to evaluating output sensitivity to uncertainty on reactor model inputs,
such as the fuel loading and cross sections, rather than the cumbersome and tedious
process of forward-propagating uncertainty along with the reactor burnup calculation;
the Monte Carlo approach toestimating sensitivity has been outlined by ANL for
estimating uncertainty on derived values [48]. In this method, many histories of the
burnup cycle are generated with input parameters sampled from distributions of basic
nuclear measurements in order to determine the sensitivity of desired outputs—in this
case, the fission rates of each isotope—from variation of the inputs for the specific
reactor under study. This approach has the advantage of simultaneously generating
the covariance matrix V of the outputs, with elements (Eq. 8):
Vij = 〈(fik − fi0)(fjk − fj0)〉k (8)
where i and j refer to the species, f is the relevant isotopic fission rate, and k denotes
the Monte Carlo history (the zero subscript refers to the history with nominal inputs).
A relative covariance matrix R is obtained by dividing the elements of V by the data
generated using nominal inputs (Eq. 9):
Rij = Vij/(fi0 × fj0) (9)
The distributions on the input parameters are constructed from the data compiled
in the appendix of Palmiotti et al. [39]. For some of the rarer reactions, particularly
(n,2n), the range values are sufficiently large to encounter negative cross sections
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as a result of sampling; if this occurs, the distribution is re-sampled to avoid non-
physical values. Although this artificially enhances the rate of higher-than-nominal
cross sections assigned to these reactions, the small chance of triggering re-sampling
combined with the—by definition—very small nominal value of the cross sections
for these reactions, ensures that the effect on overall reactor calculations is negligible.
Modifications to the cross sections, neutron yields, etc. were made at the broad-group
level.
4.3.1.2 Initial fuel loading variation
Because VARIANT [38], the nodal transport code used to generate flux solutions for
REBUS-3, homogenizes the reactor assembly within each axial mesh, the fuel loading
was kept constant due to the negligible variation in fuel enrichment and composition
at the assembly level resulting from this homogenization and the assumption that
pins would be individually measured for weight and uranium enrichment during fuel
production.
4.3.1.3 Reactor thermal power variation
The reactor thermal power is traditionally measured via a flowmeter in the steam
loop, and although currently installed flowmeters are accurate to about 2%, new
measuring techniques and equipment allow for up to an order of magnitude better
determination of the reactor output [20]. The reactor thermal power was sampled
with a 1σ value of 0.2% alongside the microscopic cross section as an input to each
of the Monte Carlo burnup histories.
4.3.2 Antineutrino yield uncertainties
The nominal fission rates, because they are the partial derivatives of the antineutrino
source with respect to the antineutrino yields, are used to calculate the contribution
of uncertainty on the yield data to the uncertainty on the reactor antineutrino source
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by weighting the bin yield uncertainty on each isotope ∆ybi by the fraction of total





This component of the uncertainty increases with burnup, chiefly due to the higher
uncertainty on 239Pu and 241Pu yields than those resulting from fission of 235U. The
238U fission rate changes very little and the other actinides fission infrequently.
The experimentally measured thermal spectrum antineutrino yield data comes
with relative errors, as shown in Table 13. It should be noted that there are errors
missing for the yields at high energy for all isotopes and just above the IBD threshold
for 238U (marked with *). The missing error data has been estimated from fitting
curves to the available yield uncertainty data with the acknowledgement that the
238U yield experiment predicted a roughly 10% higher uncertainty at low energy due
to increased background [24] and that the high uncertainty at higher energies is largely
a consequence of the poor counting statistics due to lower yields in that energy range.
The lack of widespread fast reactor use in conjunction with the lack of significant
funding directed toward antineutrino yield measurements has left the data on fast
fission of common isotopes and all modes of fission on the rarer transuranic species
sparse. The yields from these species are calculated via the ab initio summation
method from the decay paths of their fission product distributions. Because the fission
product yields of fast and thermal fission of the well-studied isotopes are very similar,
predictions of the fast fission antineutrino yields for these isotopes only differ from
their thermal-fission counterparts by ∼1%; the uncertainty data for thermal fission
will therefore be used for these isotopes under the assumption that similarly precise
data will become available with the adoption of fast reactor technologies. However,
since there is a dearth of data for the fission product distributions of the higher
actinides due to their relative scarcity in used nuclear fuel, the uncertainty on the
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antineutrino yield per fission is roughly an order of magnitude higher than for isotopes
for which experimental data is available. These isotopes have been conservatively
assumed to bear 20% uncertainties on their yields below 7.0 MeV and 50% above
that, with the restriction that yields cannot be negative.
4.3.2.1 Possible reduction in fast fission antineutrino yield data
An estimation of the magnitude of reduction in uncertainty on fast fission antineutrino
yield data achievable by near-field observation of the AFR-100 by a 5-ton SONGS-
like detector with 30% intrinsic efficiency was made in order to validate the use of
thermal-spectrum errors where available. The uncorrelated background B for mea-
surement via inverse beta decay was estimated to be about 6450 counts per day based
on the uncorrelated background in the SONGS-1 experiment [8], evenly spread across
all energy bins [1], while the correlated background is assumed to be mitigated to
negligible levels via active shielding. The standoff from the core as well as the sub-
stantial neutron and gamma shielding between the core and detector should result
in a negligible background from non-ν̄e reactor radiation. The detector measures the
reactor antineutrino source for 10 years with the reactor at full nominal power.
The resulting data did not resolve the binned yield from any of the higher plu-
tonium isotopes, even for observation extended to 30 EFPY. This is largely due to
their very low fission rates through the beginning of the burnup cycle. On the other
hand, precisions of the order of the current experimental data for thermal fission of
235U and fast fission of 238U are achievable in the center of the IBD event rate dis-
tribution (3.0-6.5 MeV) with zero prior knowledge of the yields. If observation is
allowed to continue for the entire 30-year burnup cycle unabated, precisions on the
order of 1-1.5% for 235U, 3-4% for 238U, and 10% for 239Pu are achievable. The gains
on the uranium isotopes are largely due to better statistics, but the improvement in
the 239Pu yield precision is attributable to its high fission rate in the latter half of
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the burnup cycle. With that in mind, a reactor initially fueled with either blended
reactor grade plutonium or downblended plutonium from weapons streams would be
able to significantly decrease the calculated uncertainty on all plutonium isotopes.
The use of a larger or more efficient detector would improve on the yield reductions
by approximately a factor of 1/√n through better counting statistics due to a linear
increase in detector event rates. Similarly, a reactor with a higher power output
would linearly increase the antineutrino flux incident on the detector. Depending on
advances in detector technology, the particular set of antineutrino yield observations
made between now and the implementation of fast reactors, the power rating of the
reactors, and their initial fueling, improved statistics and the incorporation of priors
may be used to hasten the refinement of fast spectrum yield data by an order of
magnitude.
4.3.3 Detector parameter uncertainty
The detector parameters which were considered to contribute to uncertainty on antineutrino-
like event rates are the reactor-detector standoff, the number of target protons in the
fiducial volume, the IBD cross section value, and the intrinsic efficiency. Because
these arise from distinct physical phenomena, they are considered independent and
are added in quadrature (Equation 11) to obtain the total contribution to uncertainty











The reactor-detector standoff is considered to be known to an absolute 1σ level of
1 cm. This is based on the assumptions that the detector and its ensemble of shielding
structures has a well-known size, that it is placed adjacent to a wall in the containment
building in an effort to minimize the standoff, and the construction of the containment
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building is executed with the extreme precision usually associated with safety-related
nuclear structures.
4.3.3.2 Number of target protons
The segmented structure of the detector allows for individual measurement of empty
and filled liquid scintillator cells, providing high precision on the mass of scintillator
in each segment. The variation in composition as-produced is not available in the
EJ-309 documentation [52], but the use of calibration sources both prior to detector
assembly and during reactor-off periods in concert with the scintillator mass data
should provide a narrow envelope on the composition of each segment. The number
of target protons is conservatively assumed to vary by 1% when considered across the
entire fiducial volume, allowing for much greater variability on a per-segment basis.
4.3.3.3 Inverse beta decay cross section
The current uncertainty on the magnitude of the energy-dependent IBD cross section
is reported to be 1.4% [58]. This value is used as a conservative estimate of the
uncertainty on its magnitude that will exist some 5-10 years from present, when
next-generation fast reactors might begin to see deployment. Some neutrino physics
experiments, both ongoing and those about to enter their data collection phase, have
reduction of IBD cross section uncertainty as a stated or implied goal of the program.
4.3.3.4 Detector intrinsic efficiency
The PROSPECT team has noted that efficiencies among the segments comprising the
fiducial volume are largely consistent to percent-level 1σ deviations and that on-line
calibration using inserted gamma and neutron sources as well as analysis of back-
ground levels can correct these deviations [5]. Despite the ability to correct variation
in segment efficiency, a relative 1% uncertainty on detector intrinsic efficiency is re-
tained to account for comparison with poorly-characterized background, the potential
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malfunction of calibration equipment that degrades the confidence of the efficiency
corrections, etc.
4.3.4 Fitting errors
The statistical errors produced by the polynomial fits to reactor sources and detector
event rates in each energy bin as functions of burnup were produced along with the
fits in MATLAB. These were normalized to the range of the fit (normalized root mean
square error) and weighted by the fraction of the total source or event rate in each
bin, then summed to produce each σfit. The normalization and weighting of the root












Although the fitting errors depend on the particular diversion scenario and the
burnup at which the reference-diversion comparison is made, the fitting errors for
all of the studied diversions vary tightly around about 2% of the value of the total
calculated uncertainty on detector rates, σnorm, and about 0.1% of the magnitude of
the nominal detector event rates.
4.4 Comparison statistics
Once the reference detector signal has been compiled, the same process can be done
to provide the nominal detector signal for each diversion case. The difference in
detector signals between the reference and perturbed cases is the basis upon which
determinations about the state of the reactor are made. The spectral differences
are used to calculate a goodness-of-fit metric with a distribution that has significant
penetration into the reference case probability space, but which diverges sharply from
reference allowances for sub-optimal attempts to mask diversions.
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4.4.1 Chi-square goodness of fit
A χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic (Equation 13) can be calculated based on the difference
between the integrated detector event rates of the reference (nb (t)) and perturbed
(n
′
b (t)) states in each energy bin that allows for the reactor operator to attempt to
reduce the difference between the reference state and its post-diversion state by oper-















The last term applies a penalty to account for the fact that continuous operation
above or below the supposed nominal power (as this is the part of x which the operator
can influence), under the assumption that an independent statement of the operating
power is available, would also raise red flags for a deviation that is high relative to
the uncertainty on the power measurement. The statistic, as formulated, essentially
measures a worst-case scenario, in which the reactor operator and diverting actor
have near-perfect information on the reactor state and the required information to
best spoof detection via antineutrinos.
4.4.2 Accounting for variation about the nominal fit
The value of χ2 calculated in Equation 13 applies to the mean of the diverted-case
minimized bin difference; in reality, the world is not perfect, and the measured value
is distributed about T0 = χ









The null hypothesis against which data is compared in this test, as with IAEA
safeguards in general, is that no nuclear material has been lost. In this context, a
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false positive (Type-I error) might result in falsely concluding that material has been
diverted. Conversely, a false negative (Type-II error) happens when a diversion is
concluded to not have occurred when, in fact, it has—this is referred to as the non-
detection probability[23]. For a specified critical value of Tαcrit for which the Type-I









Power = 1− β (16)
where Φ (x) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution. Safeguards tests pre-select α = 0.05 or lower in order to keep the frequency
of false alarms low[23].
The acceptable thresholds for the power of safeguards measurements are 0.9 for
high-probability events and 0.2 for low-probability events[23]—the lower threshold
in the latter case represents the impetus for action on less certain data due to the
generally high consequences of an ignored but real low-probability event. However,
the normal distribution of the goodness-of-fit χ2 results in Power = β = 0.5 at T0
= Tαcrit, so should the diversion of material from a functioning reactor be classified
as a low-probability event, it is likely that a reduced false-positive threshold would
be employed to take advantage of data with non-negligible indication that immediate
inspection and/or international intervention is required. However, regularly updated
integration of detector events—one of the more intuitive ways to condense time-series
safeguards data—would then give many false positives, depending on how often the
metric is updated. For example, if the cumulative detector event count is updated
daily and the safeguards discrimination has a false positive rate of 0.05, we should
expect 18.25 false positive events per year according to the binomial distribution with
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n = 365 and p = 0.05. In order to avoid frequent expensive action based on false-
positive indications from antineutrino safeguards mechanisms alone, their data should
be used in conjunction with other safeguards metrics to allow joint probabilities to
guide inspector deployments or corrective measures.
4.5 Figures of merit
With the need for high discrimination power and fast detection times combined with
the desirability of low false-positive rates, three metrics present themselves as attrac-
tive for consideration:
1. Certitude of non-diversion: for the maximum-allowed Type-I error rate and
integration allowed over the entire duration of the relevant weapon conversion
time (3 months for plutonium, 1 year for LEU), what is the probability that a
diversion went undetected?
2. Speed of determination: for the maximum-allowed Type-I and Type-II error
rates, what integration time for which the detector event difference produces
the nominal χ2 = Tαcrit?
3. Significance of determination: for the maximum-allowed Type-II error rate and
integration allowed over the entire duration of the relevant weapon conversion
time, what is the false positive rate?
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CHAPTER V
REFERENCE FUEL CYCLE RESULTS AND
UNCERTAINTY
There are three fuel cycle parameters which have prime relevance to antineutrino
safeguards: core excess reactivity, isotopic fission rates, and plutonium inventory.
The excess reactivity of a core is an indication of how much fissile material can
be removed from a core and the core still be able to maintain criticality. Both the
AFR-100 and UCFR-1000 have a small beginning-of-cycle excess reactivity and use
bred-in plutonium to offset the reactivity loss from the depletion of the initial charge
of 235U. The result is an extremely flat reactivity curve as a function of burnup that
reactor design engineers tend to keep as close above critical as possible for safety
purposes.
As mentioned prior, the fission rates of each isotope are the mechanism by which
the measurable differences in reference and perturbed antineutrino signal can be as-
certained. Finally, the plutonium inventory measures the amount and purity of the
product to be gained by a diverting actor.
The total plutonium inventory of the core is a useful tool for core-level diversion
scenarios; for assembly-level scenarios, it is an indication of the average plutonium
content per assembly, with central assemblies usually having higher amounts of less
pure plutonium. Peripheral assemblies, by contrast, tend to have lower amounts of
plutonium in higher purities.
The uncertainty established via the Monte Carlo sampling of modeling inputs is
reported alongside each of these parameters. The uncertainty on the isotopic fission
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rates is afforded the most detail because these are necessary to calculate the uncer-
tainty on the nominal event rates in the antineutrino detector. Because the perturbed
core states simulated in each of the diversion scenarios are not substantially different
from the reference cases at the whole-core level, the reference case uncertainties are
also used for the perturbed state fission rate data. Convergence of the sample vari-
ances is used to determine that the variance estimates for these parameters obtained
by averaging over all of the available Monte Carlo fuel cycle histories is representative
of the true variances.
5.1 AFR-100 reference fuel cycle
The AFR-100 fuel cycle features a bowed reactivity curve typical of a fast breeder
reactor. Its conversion ratio, however, is only about 0.8[30], implying less end-of-
cycle plutonium inventory. This is reflected in the incomplete conversion from 235U
to 239Pu in the isotopic fission rates, although the swing is more pronounced than in
commercial LWR’s.
5.1.1 Reactivity
The small excess reactivity throughout the AFR-100 burnup cycle is the result of two
primary design decisions: to preserve passive shutdown capability even in the case
of stuck control rods and to achieve an even coolant outlet temperature across the
core[30]. These objectives drove the decision fot the onion enrichment scheme, and
the resulting excess reactivity in combination with the small core size (150 total fuel
assemblies) mean that diversion scenarios which do not replace (in the form of LEU)
some of the stolen fissile material may render the core subcritical, even for scenarios
which only involve a single assembly. The evolution of the core reactivity, measured
via the reactor eigenvalue keff, as a function of burnup is shown in Figure 20. keff > 1
indicates supercriticality, keff = 1 criticality, and keff < subcriticality. The eigenvalue
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is calculated for the all rods out position of the control assemblies; these are partially
inserted to achieve k = 1 during operation.
Burnup (EFPY)



















Figure 20: AFR-100 eigenvalue evolution in the all rods out condition. Operation
with a smooth 90% capacity factor is shown for reference.
The reactor was designed with a 90% capacity factor in mind; full power with
100% capacity is used in the safeguards analysis because this is the only reasonably
predictable outcome of a full maintenance shutdown which would facilitate a diversion
in the first place. The protective value of low excess reactivity against diversions with
a large net loss of fissile material will be most pronounced at the end of the burnup
cycle, when excess reactivity is the lowest.
5.1.2 Fission rates
The evolution of the isotopic fission rates in the AFR-100 proceeds with 235U domi-
nating power production in the early cycle and ceding primacy to 239Pu by the end
of cycle. The transition from burning 235U to 239Pu is more complete than in typical
modern commercial light water reactors, in which the isotopes typically do not quite
reach equal power production. The fission rate of 238U remained nearly constant
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throughout the burnup cycle, and 240Pu and 241Pu were not produced in large enough










































Figure 21: (a) Evolution of the fission rates of the primary power-producing fuel
isotopes through the burnup cycle. (b) 1σ relative errors on the fission rates.
Should there be a diversion of plutonium from the core with LEU replacement,
the fission rates will, for the most part, “reset” to the ratio exhibited by a lesser
burnup. The magnitude of the reset is determined by the amount removed/replaced
and, to a lesser extent, the location of the diverted assembly or assemblies. If the only
available replacement fuel material is natural uranium, the location of the diversion
will determine whether the fission rates, upon resuming operation, would resemble
a regressed or progressed burnup. A local flux depression caused by diversion near
the core center suppresses plutonium fission rates, regressing the burnup, while a
depression in the periphery is more likely to suppress 235U fission at least as much as
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that of bred-in plutonium.
The uncertainties on the isotopic fission rates are expressed in the covariance
matrices calculated via the method outlined in Section 4.3.1.1. Four burnups, the
beginning-, middle-, and end- of-cycle, in addition to 1 EFPY were selected to illus-
trate the change in magnitude, particularly among the plutonium isotopes, as burnup
progresses. The complex interdependence of the modifications to the reactor input
parameters produces a large degree of non-diagonality in the covariance matrix span-
ning the fission rates of the heavy metal isotopes, as shown in Table 14. By the end
of cycle, the off-diagonal elements for all isotope pairs has increased to similar mag-
nitudes, as opposed to the beginning-of-cycle variation concentrated in the uranium
isotopes.
5.1.3 Plutonium inventory
The AFR-100 lacks dedicated blanket assemblies that bear fuel with natural uranium
enrichment. Instead, the breed-in of plutonium is fairly balanced across the core with
the exception of the outer row of assemblies because the flux is propped up by the
(at the lowest) 8% 235U initial enrichment. This opens the door to a variety of di-
version scenarios, in which the actor may choose an assembly at-will past mid-cycle
with reasonable certainty to obtain 1 SQ of plutonium. Conversely, the distributed
plutonium inventory prevents acquisition of 1 SQ without removing multiple assem-
blies until at least 15.75 EFPY, protecting the installation from use in proliferation
schemes through the early cycle. Barring removal of a significant fraction of the core,
adding an AFR-100 installation to a nation’s energy production capacity should not
significantly affect its breakout period without detection by a monitoring body.
The core-averaged plutonium content per assembly (Figure 22) only barely exceeds
1 SQ by the end of cycle, indicating that either mid- to late-cycle diversions of single
central assemblies or mid- to late-cycle multiple-assembly diversions from the core
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Table 14: Covariance matrices of AFR fission rates for selected burnups (primary
isotopes). Correlation between the isotopic fission rates increases with increasing
burnup. With the exception of the very beginning of irradiation, correlation between
235U (and 238U) and Pu isotopes is negative (the more fissions occur in 235U (and
238U), the fewer are required in Pu isotopes in order to compensate for constant
power requirement.) Correlation between Pu isotopes is positive due to direct fission-
capture relation (recall that 240Pu and 241Pu are produced by neutron capture on
239Pu.)
0 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 1.23× 1032 −9.01× 1031 −1.00× 1024 3.83× 1022 −4.93× 1023
238U −9.01× 1031 8.81× 1031 2.48× 1023 −1.76× 1023 −6.39× 1023
239Pu −1.00× 1024 2.48× 1023 1.99× 1018 1.39× 1017 1.04× 1018
240Pu 3.83× 1022 −1.76× 1023 1.39× 1017 1.41× 1017 1.61× 1017
241Pu −4.93× 1023 −6.39× 1023 1.04× 1018 1.61× 1017 8.28× 1018
1 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 1.27× 1032 −8.93× 1031 −4.86× 1030 −3.31× 1027 −5.74× 1025
238U −8.93× 1031 8.73× 1031 6.71× 1029 −1.01× 1026 −5.03× 1024
239Pu −4.86× 1030 6.71× 1029 2.68× 1030 1.90× 1027 3.24× 1025
240Pu −3.31× 1027 −1.01× 1026 1.90× 1027 3.53× 1024 4.79× 1022
241Pu −5.74× 1025 −5.03× 1024 3.24× 1025 4.79× 1022 1.60× 1021
15 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 2.02× 1032 −3.98× 1031 −1.37× 1032 −1.64× 1030 −3.51× 1029
238U −3.98× 1031 7.90× 1031 −3.42× 1031 −4.59× 1029 −9.87× 1028
239Pu −1.37× 1032 −3.42× 1031 1.71× 1032 1.79× 1030 3.74× 1029
240Pu −1.64× 1030 −4.59× 1029 1.79× 1030 1.20× 1029 1.79× 1028
241Pu −3.51× 1029 −9.87× 1028 3.74× 1029 1.79× 1028 8.38× 1027
30 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 9.60× 1031 −2.47× 1030 −7.70× 1031 −1.89× 1030 −8.11× 1029
238U −2.47× 1030 7.64× 1031 −6.51× 1031 −1.71× 1030 −5.89× 1029
239Pu −7.70× 1031 −6.51× 1031 1.52× 1032 1.40× 1030 5.29× 1029
240Pu −1.89× 1030 −1.71× 1030 1.40× 1030 1.23× 1030 2.61× 1029
241Pu −8.11× 1029 −5.89× 1029 5.29× 1029 2.61× 1029 2.50× 1029
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periphery are the minimum acceptable options for an actor seeking weaponizable
plutonium.
Burnup [EFPY]


























Figure 22: Core-averaged plutonium mass (kg) per assembly as a function of burnup.
5.1.4 Convergence of the Monte-Carlo sampled fuel cycle histories
At least 1000 fuel cycle histories are recommended [48] in order to reduce statistical
variability of the generated elements of the covariance matrix, Vij, to ∼ 3%. The con-
vergence of the fission rate variances was checked by sampling n histories, averaging
them, and taking the relative difference to the value of the “converged” variance ob-
tained by using all 1000 histories. The AFR-100 data from the middle of the burnup
cycle (15 EPFY)—when the bred-in isotopes have had sufficient time to accumulate
substantially in the fuel— was used as a proxy for the whole dataset, as checking
for convergence of the variances at all burnup steps becomes prohibitively computa-
tionally expensive once more than a couple hundred histories are amassed. Sampling
n variances as described produces a chi-square distribution with n − 1 degrees of








The convergence behavior of the variances for the primary power-producing iso-
topes in the AFR-100 as more histories are sampled is illustrated in Figure 23.
5.1.5 Antineutrino signal evolution
The progression of the isotopic fission rates in the AFR-100 manifests itself as a
slowly diminishing signal to a nearby antineutrino detector. The steady transition
to producing power through plutonium fission reduces the intensity of the reactor
antineutrino source as burnup progresses (Figure 24). The relative errors on the an-
tineutrino source increase steadily throughout the burnup cycle as core plutonium
content increases. Although some of this increase is due to higher aggregate uncer-
tainty on the fission rates themselves, the vast majority of the uncertainty on the
reactor antineutrino source propagates from the expected antineutrino yield per fis-
sion. The large increase in antineutrino source uncertainty by the end of the burnup
cycle results from the proportionally higher contribution from fissions of plutonium
isotopes, for which the antineutrino yields are less certain.
The nominal signal in each detector of the RETINA suite is shown in Figure 25
as a function of burnup and given in Table 15 for various burnups. The smoothly
diminishing source intensity is one of the features which would be disrupted by a
potential proliferator who removes some bred-in plutonium. The reactor operator can
offset this disruption by precisely adjusting the reactor power, but another feature
of the signal evolution evades such attempts to dissemble: the signal on the high-
energy side of the peak falls away more quickly than that on the low-energy side.
This spectral evolution feature cannot be masked by manipulation of the reactor
antineutrino source, and attempts to prop up the high-energy side of the spectrum via
exposure of the detector to another coincident positron-neutron phenomenon would
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(a) 235U (b) 238U
(c) 239Pu (d) 241Pu
Figure 23: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of
the primary power-producing isotopes in the AFR-100 at 15 EFPY. The calculated
variance converges as more histories are sampled. The red curves on the enlarged
axes display the 90% confidence interval for the sample variance.
77
ν̄e energy [MeV]

























Figure 24: The reactor antineutrino source emitted by the AFR-100 at nominal power
shown with (a) relative errors due to fission rate uncertainties, and (b) relative errors
due to antineutrino yield uncertainties.
be made obvious as the second phenomenon drowned out the antineutrino signal.
5.2 UCFR-1000 reference fuel cycle
The UCFR-1000, in contrast with the AFR-100, undergoes a complete conversion
to burning 239Pu early in the cycle and relies on further 239Pu production in the
fertile column to continue its cycle. The in-place conversion and beginning of burn
zone motion gives rise to somewhat exotic reactivity evolution with burnup in the
first quarter of its fuel cycle, after which it continues in a nearly steady state. The
plutonium inventory of the UCFR is more heterogeneous than in the AFR due to
its simpler enrichment scheme, and because there is residual plutonium left behind
as the burn zone progresses and the taller fuel elements, each assembly eventually
accumulates far more plutonium. In addition, because there are 378 fuel assemblies
in the UCFR compared to 150 in the AFR, there are more diversion options which
are, in general, less disruptive to core operation.
Due to burnup code difficulties, only the first half of the fuel cycle could be
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Table 15: Event rates in each detector of the RETINA suite due to the reactor an-
tineutrino source emitted by the AFR-100 at various burnups and due to cosmogenic
background estimated using the PROSPECT data. All count rates are in units of
10-3 counts/sec.
Bin 0 EFPY 5 EFPY 10 EFPY 20 EFPY 30 EFPY Background
1 0.497 0.489 0.481 0.466 0.455 0.899
2 1.346 1.321 1.297 1.256 1.224 0.994
3 2.090 2.047 2.006 1.935 1.879 0.918
4 2.497 2.433 2.374 2.272 2.192 1.158
5 2.594 2.515 2.442 2.315 2.217 0.429
6 2.314 2.228 2.148 2.010 1.903 0.576
7 1.952 1.870 1.794 1.662 1.560 0.442
8 1.566 1.497 1.433 1.322 1.237 0.944
9 1.139 1.086 1.036 0.951 0.885 0.829
10 0.769 0.731 0.695 0.634 0.586 0.129
11 0.484 0.458 0.435 0.394 0.363 0.451
12 0.251 0.237 0.225 0.203 0.186 0.387
13 0.116 0.110 0.104 0.094 0.086 0.331
14 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.040 0.037 0.389
15 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.244
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Figure 25: The expected detector signal diminishes in intensity and slightly shifts its
peak to lower energy as burnup progresses in the AFR-100.
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modeled, but as this is well into steady-state motion of the burn zone, the data
from 15+ EFPY allows for study of diversions which should give insight into mid- to
late-cycle diversion scenarios.
5.2.1 Reactivity
The large fertile column in the UCFR-1000 results in an almost perfectly flat reactivity
burnup curve once the exotic S-curve behavior from initial conversion has finished.
The UCFR then operates barely above critical—with only about 200 pcm excess
reactivity according to the REBUS model. Figure 26 shows the first half of the
UCFR reactivity evolution.
Burnup (EFPY)














Figure 26: UCFR-1000 reactivity evolution in the all rods out condition. Discontinu-
ities are present where microscopic fuel cross sections are updated; they appear large
due to the small cycle δk/k, but are O (10) pcm or less.
The temporary subcritical operation between 3 EFPY and 9.75 EFPY is a result of
using ENDF/B-VII libraries and the MCC/REBUS codes with cross section updates.
In the design paper, the reactor was modeled in MCNP and was able to maintain
criticality, although it came very close[51] to the criticality condition with all control
rods withdrawn. The S-curve reactivity evolution has the same shape as in the design
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paper[51] and matches closely with preliminary data generated with the ERANOS 2.0
code package[41] and JEFF-2 cross section libraries (Figure 27), despite the greater
duration between cross section recalculation for the preliminary data and the coarser
spatial zoning when doing so. During construction of the REBUS model, access to
ERANOS 2.1 and the JEFF-3.1 cross section libraries was briefly available, and they
showed good agreement with the preliminary data. The offset in reactivity between
ERANOS/JEFF and REBUS/ENDF is ∼ 400-600 pcm, which is consistent with
benchmark comparisons performed in these codes with ENDF/B-VII.0 and JEFF-
3.1[49]. The reactor fuel inventory was in very good agreement despite the offset in
reactor eigenvalue[49].
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Figure 27: UCFR-1000 S-curve reactivity evolution as modeled in REBUS and ER-
ANOS. The ERANOS data was used for preliminary indication of the efficacy of
safeguards scenarios but the code was found to be too unwieldy to update cross
sections while maintaining a very fine spatial mesh.
If the preliminary data more closely predicts the excess reactivity of a production
UCFR-1000, the steady-state excess is still approximately half of the peak AFR-100
excess, indicating a very slim margin to subcriticality. Because the flat enrichment
scheme creates an approximate chopped-Bessel radial flux shape, diversions of central
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assemblies will likely require LEU-based replacement assemblies, while peripheral
assemblies likely do not.
5.2.2 Fission rates
The UCFR-1000 quickly depletes its initial charge of 235U and by about 2.75 EFPY
into the burnup cycle is already burning more transuranic isotopes, primarily 239Pu,
than 235U. After the transition, the fission rates of each isotope stabilize as the burn
zone propagates upward at a steady rate and expose the neutron flux distribution to
fresh fuel, leaving the higher actinides in the depleted fuel behind. Bumpiness in the
relative errors around 6 EFPY is due to changes in microscopic cross sections during
their periodic update at the beginning of substantial burn zone distribution above
the first macro-zone demarcation.
The covariance matrices of the fission rates for the primary power-producing iso-
topes in the UCFR-1000 experience greater transformation than those for the AFR-
100, again as a result of the complete depletion of 235U. The matrices for burnups
through the transition, as well as at 15 and 25 EFPY, are given in Table 16. By
10 EFPY, the majority of the off-diagonal elements are of the same order of magni-
tude, indicating significant interplay in the errors of several isotopes instead of just
239Pu and 235U.
5.2.3 Plutonium inventory
The UCFR-1000 relies on continuous production of new plutonium in order to main-
tain criticality, and because it does not fully deplete bred-in plutonium as the burn
zone moves upward, the total plutonium inventory of the core steadily grows until
final shutdown (Figure 29). While this is clearly a liability from a nonproliferation
perspective, the plutonium vector of each assembly also becomes steadily less pure as
240Pu accumulates from neutron capture on 239Pu, complicating its use.
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Table 16: Covariance matrices for the fission rates of the main power-producing
isotopes in the UCFR-1000 for various burnups spanning the inventory transition
and first half of steady-state operation.
0 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 1.45× 1034 −1.35× 1034 −2.69× 1026 −8.77× 1024 −5.62× 1026
238U −1.35× 1034 1.28× 1034 1.06× 1026 −1.95× 1025 3.73× 1026
239Pu −2.69× 1026 1.06× 1026 1.73× 1020 8.70× 1018 1.13× 1020
240Pu −8.77× 1024 −1.95× 1025 8.70× 1018 9.35× 1018 1.51× 1019
241Pu −5.62× 1026 3.73× 1026 1.13× 1020 1.51× 1019 6.72× 1020
2 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 3.99× 1034 −4.60× 1033 −3.04× 1034 −4.71× 1032 −1.48× 1032
238U −4.60× 1033 1.08× 1034 −5.32× 1033 −1.63× 1032 −3.60× 1031
239Pu −3.04× 1034 −5.32× 1033 3.34× 1034 5.55× 1032 1.57× 1032
240Pu −4.71× 1032 −1.63× 1032 5.55× 1032 2.59× 1031 5.81× 1030
241Pu −1.48× 1032 −3.60× 1031 1.57× 1032 5.81× 1030 2.77× 1030
5 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 6.84× 1033 7.80× 1032 −5.30× 1033 −2.44× 1032 −1.60× 1032
238U 7.80× 1032 1.06× 1034 −9.46× 1033 −6.13× 1032 −2.60× 1032
239Pu −5.30× 1033 −9.46× 1033 1.49× 1034 4.10× 1032 1.36× 1032
240Pu −2.44× 1032 −6.13× 1032 4.10× 1032 2.51× 1032 8.58× 1031
241Pu −1.60× 1032 −2.60× 1032 1.36× 1032 8.58× 1031 9.46× 1031
10 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 1.64× 1033 −2.77× 1032 −1.55× 1032 −2.64× 1032 −2.88× 1032
238U −2.77× 1032 1.03× 1034 −7.76× 1033 −8.09× 1032 −3.65× 1032
239Pu −1.55× 1032 −7.76× 1033 1.05× 1034 −2.43× 1032 −4.12× 1032
240Pu −2.64× 1032 −8.09× 1032 −2.43× 1032 7.91× 1032 3.18× 1032
241Pu −2.88× 1032 −3.65× 1032 −4.12× 1032 3.18× 1032 4.90× 1032
15 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 3.19× 1032 1.16× 1031 3.42× 1032 −2.01× 1032 −1.64× 1032
238U 1.16× 1031 1.02× 1034 −7.61× 1033 −9.83× 1032 −5.13× 1032
239Pu 3.42× 1032 −7.61× 1033 1.13× 1034 −6.48× 1032 −9.03× 1032
240Pu −2.01× 1032 −9.83× 1032 −6.48× 1032 1.12× 1033 4.49× 1032
241Pu −1.64× 1032 −5.13× 1032 −9.03× 1032 4.49× 1032 7.64× 1032
25 EFPY 235U 238U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu
235U 3.48× 1031 5.58× 1031 1.53× 1032 −7.23× 1031 −3.87× 1031
238U 5.58× 1031 1.02× 1034 −7.40× 1033 −1.10× 1033 −5.88× 1032
239Pu 1.53× 1032 −7.40× 1033 1.24× 1034 −1.04× 1033 −1.28× 1033
240Pu −7.23× 1031 −1.10× 1033 −1.04× 1033 1.38× 1033 5.16× 1032
241Pu −3.87× 1031 −5.88× 1032 −1.28× 1033 5.16× 1032 9.25× 1032
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The purest plutonium exists directly above the burn zone, and despite each assem-
bly containing multiple SQ of plutonium by mid-cycle, the recoverable weapons-grade
mass remains fairly constant after steady-state burn zone propagation has begun. To
obtain several SQ of fissile material, a proliferator must choose between diverting
multiple assemblies or constructing a weapon with fuel-grade plutonium—a consider-
ably more precise task that results in a bomb with reduced yield. The average 240Pu
of the core is shown as a function of burnup in Figure 30. Assemblies in the core
center will tend to have more, dirtier plutonium than average; the converse is true
for assemblies on the core periphery.
5.2.4 Convergence of the Monte Carlo fuel cycle histories (UCFR)
The UCFR-1000 burnup cycle is much more computationally expensive to model
than the AFR-100 due to its significantly larger size, longer burnup cycle, and the
necessity for regular updates to the microscopic cross sections (each update requires
several CPU-hours apiece and cannot be parallelized with the burnup calculation).
Subsequently, only 95 Monte Carlo histories have been compiled, sufficient to reduce
the statistical variation in the calculated uncertainties to ∼ 10%. The convergence
behavior was checked at several points in the burnup cycle corresponding to the
reported covariance matrices (Table 16). The convergence of the variances of the
primary power-producing isotopes is shown in Figures 31-35. The variances appear
to be converging as expected, and because the contribution of the antineutrino yields
to the reactor antineutrino source uncertainty tends to dominate that of the fission
rate uncertainties[50], any statistical fluctuations resulting from only using 95 histories
instead of 1000 or more should be very small by comparison (< 1%).
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Table 17: Event rates in each detector of the RETINA suite due to the reactor
antineutrino source emitted by the UCFR-1000 at various burnups and due to cos-
mogenic background estimated using the PROSPECT data. All count rates are in
units of 10-3 counts/sec.
Bin 0 EFPY 2 EFPY 5 EFPY 10 EFPY 25 EFPY Background
1 2.43 2.29 2.18 2.12 2.09 0.899
2 6.58 6.17 5.85 5.68 5.61 0.994
3 10.23 9.52 8.97 8.67 8.55 0.918
4 12.22 11.19 10.41 9.97 9.78 1.158
5 12.71 11.44 10.46 9.91 9.69 0.429
6 11.34 9.97 8.89 8.30 8.05 0.576
7 9.58 8.26 7.24 6.66 6.43 0.442
8 7.69 6.58 5.72 5.24 5.04 0.944
9 5.60 4.74 4.08 3.71 3.55 0.829
10 3.78 3.17 2.69 2.42 2.31 0.129
11 2.38 1.98 1.66 1.48 1.41 0.451
12 1.24 1.02 0.85 0.75 0.71 0.387
13 0.58 0.47 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.331
14 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.389
15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.244
5.2.5 Antineutrino signal evolution
The UCFR-1000 reactor antineutrino source rapidly diminishes in the first ∼ 5 years
of full-power operation as the fission isotopic evolution proceeds and burn zone prop-
agation begins. The majority of the shift to steady state behavior of the antineutrinos
emanating from an operating UCFR-1000 has occurred by this point; the antineu-
trino source shown for 25 EFPY is almost exactly the same as the full-power source
from 10 EFPY through final shutdown (60 EFPY).
The nominal signal in each detector of the RETINA suite due to the UCFR-1000
reactor antineutrino soruce is shown in Figure 25 and given at various burnups in
Table 17. The reduction in peak count rates as well as the differential behavior of the
high- and low-energy spectrum behavior is more striking than in the signal from the
AFR-100. Disruption of the steady-state signal strength and spectrum shape after
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Figure 28: Evolution of the fission rates of the main power-producing isotopes in the
UCFR-1000 during the first half of its burnup cycle (a) and their relative 1σ errors.
Note the much lower rate of 235U fissions compared to the AFR-100 once the initial
fissile charge has been depleted.
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Figure 29: Core-averaged plutonium mass (kg) per assembly as a function of burnup.
The average plutonium mass per assembly steadily grows throughout the burnup
cycle due to burn zone motion but has substantially higher 240Pu content than in the
AFR-100.
Burnup [EFPY]

















Figure 30: Core-averaged 240Pu fraction of the UCFR-1000 as a function of burnup.
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Figure 31: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of 235U
in the UCFR-1000. The calculated variance converges as more histories are sampled.







































































































































Figure 32: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of 238U
in the UCFR-1000. The calculated variance converges as more histories are sampled.







































































































































Figure 33: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of 239Pu
in the UCFR-1000. The calculated variance converges as more histories are sampled.







































































































































Figure 34: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of 240Pu
in the UCFR-1000. The calculated variance converges as more histories are sampled.







































































































































Figure 35: Convergence behavior of the sample variances for the fission rates of 241Pu
in the UCFR-1000. The calculated variance converges as more histories are sampled.
































Figure 36: The reactor antineutrino source emitted by the UCFR-1000 at nominal
power shown with (a) relative errors due to fission rate uncertainties, and (b) relative
errors due to antineutrino yield uncertainties.
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Figure 37: The expected detector signal quickly diminishes in the first few years of




DIVERSION SCENARIO RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the safeguards test sensitivity to the modeled diversion scenarios indi-
cate that current-generation near-field antineutrino detectors are not quite up to the
task of protecting against some of the most difficult-to-detect diversions of nuclear
material from a long-life fast reactor. However, the safeguards performance in some of
the core-center diversion scenarios approached the required sensitivity (20%) for low-
probability events, as defined by the IAEA[23], particularly if the reactor operator(s)
were ignorant of the value of masking the diversion via thermal output manipulation
or unable to execute masking with the necessary precision.
The safeguards performance of the antineutrino detector suite tended to perform
better for UCFR monitoring than for AFR monitoring. This is due to a combination
of the higher signal to background ratio provided by the tenfold higher reactor power
and the more sudden and complete transition of the fissile core inventory from initial
loading to isotopes bred in situ. Core-center diversions tended to be more visible per
SQ removed than those from the core periphery.
Unless otherwise indicated, all sensitivity calculations are carried out for 3-month
count integrations of three 42%-efficient detectors with 5-ton fiducial masses observing
reactors operating at a power which minimizes the difference in detector signal from a
standoff of 17 m (AFR) or 25 m (UCFR) with background from cosmogenic neutrons
of the same scale as at HFIR and an allowed false positive rate of 5%. No reduction
in the uncertainty of antineutrino yields has been assumed, although some amount
of reduction is likely available for installations of cores which are not first-of-a-kind.
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Table 18: Safeguards test sensitivity for the UCFR-1000 diversion scenarios with 1-,
2-, and 3-month count integration periods. The last column is the 3-month count
period, but with no attempt made to mask the diversion via power manipulation.
ID 1 month 2 months 3 months No masking
1a 1.149× 10−10 4.276× 10−6 1.541× 10−4 0.255
1b 2.943× 10−5 3.257× 10−3 1.676× 10−2 0.523
2a 0 0 0 0
2b 0 0 0 0
3a 0 0 0 2.154× 10−4
3b 0 0 0 7.685× 10−4
6.1 UCFR diversion scenarios
The UCFR diversions which took place in the core center (1a and 1b) were more
visible to antineutrino detectors by a very large margin than those from the core
periphery. The primary reason for this dichotomy is that the 0th-order Bessel shape
of the radial flux distribution arising from the flat enrichment scheme of the initial
core loading. This flux shape is responsible for the much earlier availability of 1 SQ
of plutonium in the core center as well, so it is a double-edged sword in terms of
maintaining a long breakout period for the user nation of a UCFR-like reactor: SQ-
level plutonium is available only a couple of years after reactor startup, but visibility
of any missing plutonium is significantly higher. The safeguards test sensitivities for
integration times spanning up to the weapon conversion time for plutonium obtained
from irradiated fuel are compiled in Table 18, and the fractional power change required
to minimize the goodness-of-fit function and its minimized and unminimized values
are shown in Table 19. The nuisance factor is the fraction by which reactor power
was temporarily increased or decreased following the diversion in order to minimize
the difference in detector signal between the reference and perturbed signals.
The sensitivities for non-masked diversions were included at the 3-month mark
96
Table 19: Goodness-of-fit minimization parameters and χ2 values for the UCFR-1000
diversion scenarios for count integration periods of 3 months.
ID Power adjustment Minimized χ2 Un-minimized χ2
1a −1.031× 10−3 0.25 1.99
1b −1.469× 10−3 0.59 4.07
2a −7.031× 10−5 1.16× 10−3 7.19× 10−3
2b 7.813× 10−5 9.86× 10−4 8.52× 10−3
3a −4.063× 10−4 4.11× 10−2 0.26
3b 4.531× 10−4 3.53× 10−3 0.31
to illustrate the necessity of some level of masking to the diverting actor’s ability to
remain covert; in the cases with core-center diversions, masking efforts are the differ-
ence between almost certainly remaining undetected and being caught with likelihood
in the tens of percent. Figures 38 to 43 illustrate the minimization difference by com-
paring the contribution to the goodness-of-fit summation contributions of each bin
from the minimized and un-minimized functions for each of the diversion scenarios.
A set of minimized nominal counts which aligned perfectly with the horizontal cen-
terline would indicate perfect spectral agreement with the reference case values, and
alignment of un-minimized nominal counts would indicate both spectral and reactor
thermal power agreement.
Although antineutrino safeguards were insufficient to provide assurance of the
core fissile inventory within the 3-month conversion time, count integration duration
was varied smoothly out to 1 EFPY in order to assess a secondary value of contin-
uous monitoring: confidence that such a diversion has not taken place further than
3 months in the past. The improvement in safeguards test sensitivity as integra-
tion times increase (Figure 44) indicates that, even with ideal masking, core-center
diversions approach 20% visibility, and for replacement with natural uranium, ex-
ceeds the threshold after about 10 months. Detection of 6-SQ diversions from the
least-important assembly locations in the UCFR enters the realm of possibility with
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Figure 38: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-1a.
several months of observation, although sensitivity to the single-assembly, 1-SQ di-
version cases is still numerically indistinguishable from zero.
6.2 AFR diversion scenarios
The antineutrino safeguards test sensitivities to the AFR-100 diversion scenarios were
much lower than for the UCFR-1000 scenarios, largely resulting from a substantially
lower signal-to-background ratio (∼ 1.5 vs ∼ 8). None of the sensitivities for di-
versions of material from the core periphery were distinguishable from zero at count
integration times of 3 months if properly masked. The test was substantially more
sensitive to core-center diversions, just as for the UCFR-1000 diversion scenarios.
However, because the AFR-100 has a flatter radial flux distribution and less concen-
trated power production, the breakout period is not shortened to less than 10 years
for single-assembly diversions (despite their invisibility to antineutrino safeguards).
The safeguards test sensitivities for integration times spanning up to 3 months post-
diversion are compiled in Table 20, including the 3-month sensitivity with no masking;
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Figure 39: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-1b.
the parameters used in the 3-month calculations are shown in Table 21. The small
difference in un-minimized signal magnitudes compared to background rates keep
the diversions invisible to antineutrino safeguards even though the test sensitivity is
improved by several orders of magnitude.
Increasing the count integration time (Figure 51) provides 1/√n improvement in
the count statistics, but remains insufficient to resolve SQ-level diversions after 1 year
without improvement of detector hardware or data processing techniques. The use
of antineutrino detectors for safeguarding the inventory of small, fast-spectrum cores
with low power density against 1-SQ diversions remains contingent on either sub-
stantial improvement of the technology or increases in total detector suite fiducial
mass.
The overall features of the un-minimized and minimized spectral differences for
the AFR-100 diversion scenarios (Figures 45 to 50) are the same as the UCFR-1000
scenarios. However, the smaller signal-to-background ratio is evident in the jagged
behavior between 5-7 MeV.
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Table 20: Safeguards test sensitivity for the AFR-100 diversion scenarios with 1-, 2-,
and 3-month count integration periods. The last column is the 3-month count period,
but with no attempt made to mask the diversion via power manipulation.
ID 1 month 2 months 3 months No masking
1a 0 0 2.516× 10−13 2.213× 10−2
1b 0 0 6.344× 10−12 8.562× 10−4
2a 0 0 0 5.626× 10−12
2b 0 0 0 0
3a 0 0 0 4.687× 10−12
3b 0 0 0 0
Table 21: Goodness-of-fit minimization parameters and χ2 values for the AFR-100
diversion scenarios for count integration periods of 3 months.
ID Power adjustment Minimized χ2 Un-minimized χ2
1a −1.469× 10−3 6.82× 10−2 0.64
1b −9.531× 10−4 7.72× 10−2 0.32
2a −5.313× 10−4 8.06× 10−3 7.69× 10−2
2b 4.063× 10−4 3.71× 10−3 4.60× 10−2
3a −5.000× 10−4 7.31× 10−3 7.63× 10−2
3b 3.750× 10−4 2.22× 10−3 3.73× 10−2
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Figure 40: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-2a.
6.3 Variation of test parameters
Parameters which serve as inputs to the goodness-of-fit test between the reference
and perturbed antineutrino signals were varied about their values for the nominal
test. In some cases, the response of the test sensitivity gives insight into the direction
which optimization efforts would yield the largest returns. In others, particularly
the required true negative rate, the sensitivity response indicates potential value of
antineutrino safeguards as red-flag indication or exclusion of diversion without access
to enriched materials. Parameter variation which results in lower test sensitivity is
used to assess elasticity to potential limitations of antineutrino safeguards imposed
by reactor plant design and siting.
Variation of the parameters about their nominal values was performed for a single
parameter at a time; although many of their effects on detector event rates can be
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Figure 41: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-2b.
described without undue mathematical vigor, the resulting test sensitivity is an inte-
grated Gaussian distribution whose mean and standard deviation change with param-
eter variation and with integration limits that shift depending on the requirements by
the monitoring agent. Behavior therefore is highly non-linear and behaves differently
across the range of variation of even a single parameter. 2- and higher-dimensional
response surfaces mapped out by simultaneous variation of multiple parameters con-
sequently provides reduced insight.
The UCFR-1000 diversion scenario results indicate that relatively modest im-
provements of multiple parameters would allow them to protect high-power cores from
early-cycle diversions, while more significant improvements and perhaps flagging-only
use are required for near-term application near low-power cores.
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Figure 42: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-3a.
6.3.1 Detector background
Reduction of the background that is indistinguishable from the reactor inverse beta
decay signal offers non-linear improvement in the signal-to-background ratio via 1/1+x-
like behavior. The effect on the ratio in the goodness-of-fit test is more pronounced
because the numerator is the difference in signals rather than the magnitude of the
signal itself—resembling instead 1/a+x for large a and x—and the resulting difference
in signal shifts the limits on integration of a Gaussian, which is well-known to have
highly non-linear effects. Safeguards test sensitivity as a function of background level
relative to that present at HFIR is shown in Figure 52.
Sensitivities to both the UCFR and AFR center-core diversions improve markedly
with background reduction. Because the UCFR signal magnitude is already substan-
tially above background, detection test power is enhanced by factors of a few for
diversions that are within reach of detection in the nominal tests. The returns on
background reduction reach multiple orders of magnitude for AFR diversions due to
their much lower raw differences in signal magnitude. While background reduction is
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Figure 43: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion UCFR-3b.
useful for large-core safeguards, it is an absolute necessity for small-core safeguards
since it affects the ratio of differences in small signals to background so drastically.
Some reduction in background through improved rejection techniques is expected
to be available within the next few years as experience with safeguards-scale seg-
mented detectors is accumulated in the PROSPECT and SOLI∂ neutrino physics
experiments. These will likely also be able to reduce the cosmogenic background
through by a small factor further optimization of shielding. Low-hanging fruit in
cosmogenic background reduction is built into reactors at lower altitudes than HFIR
(259 m above sea level) by virtue of having more atmosphere above them, although
installations at higher altitudes are correspondingly worse off. Depending on the
extent of achievable improvements in rejection and installable passive reduction, an-
tineutrino safeguards may only prove to be useful for low-lying reactor sites. If a
detector can be installed without issue directly below the core, as was done in the
ROVNO (citation) experiment, cosmogenic background would be substantially re-
duced, although the reactor-detector standoff may prove to be less than desirable.
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Figure 44: Improvement of safeguards test sensitivity as count integration times are
lengthened for the UCFR-1000 diversion scenarios.
Since the scale of core-catcher apparatus, below-vessel instrumentation, and contain-
ment building foundation are unknown at this point, analysis on below-core detector
placement was not studied.
6.3.2 Fiducial mass
Altering the total fiducial mass of the safeguards detector suite linearly scales both
the signal and background event rates, with corresponding 1/√n improvement in the
count statistics. In this respect, increases in detector fiducial mass improve reactor
state discrimination in the same manner as lengthening count integration periods.
The effect of reasonable changes to total fiducial mass on safeguards test sensitivity
is shown in Figure 53.
For diversion of a center-core assembly from the UCFR, replacement with natural
uranium fuel can be detected by tripling the detector suite fiducial mass, and replace-
ment with LEU is over 2 orders of magnitude closer to visibility. Peripheral-assembly
diversions, even for multiple SQ, remain essentially impossible to resolve. Sensitivity
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Figure 45: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-1a.
to the AFR center-core diversions, while showing marked improvement relative to the
nominal fiducial mass, are still at least 2 orders of magnitude from detectability.
It is unlikely that the amount of detector fiducial mass which could be incorpo-
rated into plant designs is less than nominal (3×5 tons), but any reductions should be
offset by improvements in other signal-magnitude-related parameters to retain per-
formance. For a given detector size, the accumulation of experience with segmented
antineutrino detectors may yield improved fiducialization techniques that allow use
of a larger fraction of total detector mass. While fiducial mass increase should not be
relied upon to shift antineutrino safeguards into viability, if the space is available for
some combination of more or larger detectors, adding mass is a financial, rather than
technical, solution that could be applied whenever necessary in order to preserve or
bolster safeguards performance.
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Figure 46: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-1b.
6.3.3 Detector efficiency
The intrinsic efficiency within the fiducial mass of surface-level, safeguards-scale an-
tineutrino detectors has improved approximately fourfold in the last 15 years [9, 12,
8, 13, 5]. This pace of efficiency increase has largely run its course, and only minor
increases are expected in the future as the 100% limit is approached. The efficiency
for PROSPECT is dominated by the ability to distinguish neutron capture events [5],
so materials, segment sizing, and multiple-segment event summation techniques are
where further gains most likely lie. Nonetheless, further improvements in detector
efficiency offer correspondingly better reactor state discrimination according to 1/√n
count statistics, as illustrated in Figure 54.
Efficiency improvements alone are insufficient to resolve any of the studied diver-
sion scenarios, even at the 100% limit. They will likely provide modest improvements
in detector statistics and may allow for cost optimization of the detector suite for
particular reactor sites.
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Figure 47: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-2a.
6.3.4 Reactor-detector standoff
The reactor-detector standoff because of 1/r2 geometric attenuation and, to a lesser
degree, any short-range neutrino oscillation physics, is one of the most important
factors which impacts the signal to background ratio. The reactor-detector standoff
for the UCFR and AFR scenarios was varied from 1.5 times its nominal value, within
which detectors could almost certainly be placed, down to 0.5 times its nominal value,
at which point further reductions in standoff would likely place the detector inside
the guard vessel. The dependence of safeguards test sensitivity on standoff over this
range is shown in Figure 55.
The maturity of the AFR-100 design provides assurance that 17 m is a maximum
value for its standoff and likely represents a near-minimum for all small, fast, sodium-
cooled cores. The UCFR-1000 scenarios were studied with a standoff based on com-
mercial PWR plant layouts, so its nominal figure is less certain. Unless the standoff
is able to be reduced to ∼ 15 m, none of the detection scenarios become sufficiently
visible. However, due to the higher scaling of safeguards test power with standoff
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Figure 48: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-2b.
improvements, small changes in containment building design could substantially im-
prove the viability of antineutrino safeguards. If, as discussed in 6.3.1, placement of
the detector directly underneath the core is possible, its standoff may differ substan-
tially from detectors co-planar with the core midline (the reactor-detector standoff at
Rovno was 18 m), but this is not a surety.
Variation of the reactor-detector standoff changes the in-plane space available
for antineutrino detectors. The circumference around which the detector suite is
distributed grows in direct proportion to the standoff; this is slower than the loss of
reactor signal magnitude, but implies that if a larger standoff proves necessary, some
of the loss in safeguards test sensitivity can be offset by adding fiducial mass.
6.3.5 Reactor operator power manipulation
It was assumed when calculating nominal safeguards test sensitivities that the reactor
operator was compliant with the diverting actor’s desire to remain covert and had
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Figure 49: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-3a.
the perfect information and operational precision necessary to fully minimize the dif-
ference in expected detector event rates. However, the imprecision of instantaneous
power measurements (order of percent deviation from nominal) and the fact that
no single person is responsible for direct operation makes power-masking efforts ex-
tremely difficult to execute in practice. Power manipulation is further complicated by
the lack of immediate feedback on the scale of the average 0.1% level required in the
absence of large short-term power swings that also run the risk of being identified by
antineutrino monitoring equipment—the operator would not necessarily know that
they performed any particular manipulation correctly. The non-masked versions of
nominal sensitivities are orders of magnitude higher, indicating that this is a key fac-
tor in the success of antineutrino safeguards to determine the core fissile inventory on
a 1-SQ level. The nuisance factor applied to represent thermal power manipulation
was varied smoothly from zero to twice its nominal values for each diversion scenario;
the resulting safeguards test sensitivity response is shown in Figure56.
In the absence of masking attempts, both center-core diversions from the UCFR
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Figure 50: Effect of minimization on the contribution to the goodness-of-fit function
from each bin for diversion AFR-3b.
become detectable by 3 months after the diversion. If minimization is not precisely
performed, the chance of maintaining covertness drops dramatically. Masking, even
if carefully orchestrated, is unlikely to be perfectly executed. Furthermore, if perfect
information is not obtained and the average power is varied too far or in the wrong
direction from nominal, antineutrino safeguards are more likely than not to indicate
that a diversion has occurred. The AFR diversion scenarios do not become visible
with zero masking, but the visibility of the core-center diversions increases by several
orders of magnitude. The severity of consequences for improper masking for some
diversion scenarios may sufficiently restrict operator behavior within those scenarios
to using methods which risk detector by means other than antineutrinos.
It should be noted that the scaling of test sensitivity to operation with off-nominal
power are for core states that are perturbed, not for a reference core with expected
amounts of uncertainty on its thermal power. Cores with none of their fissile inven-
tory altered have identical expected antineutrino spectra to the reference case, and
the operating power can be verified by comparing total detector counts with their
111
Time since diversion [EFPD]

























Figure 51: Improvement of safeguards test sensitivity as count integration times are
lengthened for the AFR-100 diversion scenarios.
expected values, a much more expeditious determination.
6.3.6 Required true negative rate
The IAEA requires safeguards tests to have at most a 5% false positive rate to avoid
costly deployments of inspectors to a large number of situations in which no material
has been diverted. However, non-invasive continuous monitoring of functioning re-
actors may provide red-flagging functionality which has been previously unavailable
that does not prompt inspector deployment, but which does initiate deeper study.
Conversely, if other parameters can be improved to the point where false positive
rates below 5% are achievable without sacrificing test sensitivity, antineutrino safe-
guards could act as a standalone indicator of the integrity of the declared reactor
fissile inventory.
Variation of the required true negative rate of the safeguards test shifts the integra-
tion limits of the Gaussian distribution describing the perturbed signal (Equation 14),
which captures much more of the area underneath if the nominal limits are near its
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Figure 52: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to background levels at the detector
installation. Only center-core diversions are shown for numerical reasons.
mean—this occurs in diversion scenarios which are within an order of magnitude or
so of visibility under nominal parameters.
Depending on the willingness of the monitoring agent to sacrifice the rate of true
negatives, the true positive rate can be dramatically improved. For continuous mon-
itoring, this behavior provides the ability to set a variety of conditions based on time
since last reactor shutdown, time since last on-site inspection, or confidence that LEU
above a certain enrichment is unavailable, etc., for which high sensitivity is achievable
without undue increase in expenditure of logistical resources or inspector manpower.
The effect is strong enough that UCFR-1000 scenario with 6-SQ diversion from the
core edge approaches visibility, albeit at the cost of falsely flagging the site under half
of the tests in which the null hypothesis (no diversion) remains true. The AFR scenar-
ios require similarly unacceptable sacrifices of true negative rates in order to achieve
visibility of single-SQ diversions, indicating that antineutrino safeguards require sig-





















































Figure 53: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to variation of the total fiducial
mass of the detector suite.
6.3.7 Uncertainty reduction
The nominal safeguards test results conservatively assumed that there would be no
reduction in the detector event rate uncertainties between now and when near-field
antineutrino safeguards might be implemented. This gap is likely at least a few years,
perhaps over a decade in length, and during this time data will be gathered by multiple
near-field neutrino physics experiments. Coupled with the reasonable assumption
that any reactor installation in a non-nuclear state would not be a first-of-a-kind
system, but rather a well-understood plant with at least a few reactor-years’ worth of
operational experience, there are almost certainly going to be some refinements of the
reactor antineutrino source measurement and modeling. Since the uncertainty on the
detector event rates would be reduced by a factor of 2/3 for a perfectly characterized
antineutrino source term and over half the remaining magnitude of σnorm is due to
uncertainty on the IBD cross section—which is also likely to be reduced to some extent
by upcoming near-field experiments—reductions in event rate uncertainties up to an
order of magnitude may be achievable prior to antineutrino safeguards deployment.
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Figure 54: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to improvements in the detector
efficiency within the fiducial mass.
The response of safeguards test sensitivity to reductions in σnorm is shown in Figure 58.
The signal-to-background ratio plays a large role in the amount of reduction in
σnorm required before the test sensitivity becomes elastic to changes in the parameter.
This behavior is a result of the formulation of the goodness-of-fit summation in which
the normalized and minimized count rate differences form most of the terms, to which
is added a “penalty” term accounting for prolonged average reactor operation which
departs from declared nominal values. For the UCFR, the signal to background ratio
is sufficiently high that the bulk of the chi-square summation is due to differences
in detector counts, with only a small contribution from the penalty term. It does
not contribute significantly to the sum until reduction by approximately a factor of
5. The AFR, with a fivefold smaller signal-to-background ratio, has a low minimized
difference in detector counts, so safeguards test sensitivity is more elastic to the
diversion scenarios from its core.
Improvements to the detector apparatus and background rejection will tend to






















































Figure 55: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to variation of the reactor-detector
standoff.
less return for doing so. However, reductions to σnorm will correspondingly tend
to strengthen the test sensitivity the most for diversions which appear closest to the
reference antineutrino signature when minimized and those which require larger levels
of power manipulation to achieve minimization of the detector count differences.
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Figure 56: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to masking efforts undertaken by
the reactor operator(s).
Required true negative rate
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Figure 58: Effect on the safeguards sensitivity test to the relative reduction in the




Nuclear energy generation is likely to expand in the coming decades to meet the
demand for a substantial base electricity source which does not emit copious levels
of CO2. Nuclear safeguards institutions have identified continuous monitoring as a
key capability to combat nuclear proliferation which would both better ensure that
nonproliferation goals are met and reduce the stress on the safeguards infrastructure
that a large number of nations in possession of nuclear reactor facilities would pose.
Near-field antineutrino detectors have previously been shown to provide safeguards-
usable information on the on/off power state of a reactor, its approximate operating
power, and the bulk evolution of core isotopics within a timely manner for a commer-
cial LWR. Their ability to protect against small changes to the core fissile inventory
for reactor types with more subtle isotopic evolution than GW-scale LWR’s is a strin-
gent test which indicates their readiness for deployment for continuous monitoring
safeguards missions.
To that end, the signal in an antineutrino detector suite with the characteristics of
a current-generation detector design was modeled for reference nominal progression of
low- and high-power long-life fast reactors from which irradiated fuel is not normally
discharged. Scenarios in which a determined, technologically proficient, and well-
supplied actor removed single-SQ amounts of plutonium were devised based upon
prioritizing both short-term availability of the plutonium and making the smallest
possible perturbations to the core composition to avoid detection. The estimated
antineutrino signal in these scenarios resulting from the perturbed core states was
compared with the reference signal via a goodness-of-fit test incorporating estimates
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of the uncertainty on the detector signal that were precise where able and conservative
in assumption where precision was precluded.
The goodness with which the perturbed signal fit the reference signal was high
enough that reasonable confidence of the integrity of the core fissile inventory was
unable to be ascertained. However, this depended very strongly on the reactor oper-
ator’s ability and willingness to hide the diversion; in the early-acquisition scenarios
with a high-power core, it was the difference between covertness and a detection
probability of above 20%.
While antineutrino detectors are not yet sufficiently advanced to provide stan-
dalone protection against small, covert diversions of nuclear material in the most dif-
ficult scenarios in which diversion might occur, there are advances to the technology
and its operational experience within reach in the near term that would substantially
improve their efficacy in continuous reactor safeguards. It is not unreasonable to ex-
pect that the maximum amount of covertly-obtainable plutonium from a reactor will
drop below one SQ in the coming decade, provided the core has a sufficiently high
power and even distribution of fissions.
The capabilities, as developed today, of ton-scale segmented antineutrino detectors
allow for the exclusion of certain material diversions within meaningful amounts of
time after such diversion may have occurred. Some qualifications regarding a cap on
the amount of material removed and the neutronic properties of replacement material
can be made, providing for their use in concert with information on other aspects of
a nation’s nuclear program—for example, if their access to uranium enriched above
a certain degree can be excluded. Relaxation of requirements on false positive rates
could be useful for remotely red-flagging facilities and the direction and coordination
of other safeguards efforts, perhaps informing the deployment of inspectors.
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7.1 Future work
In addition to the basic science measurements which would improve the efficacy of
antineutrino safeguards as inputs—it really would be helpful to have a base of ILL-
like experimental measurements for fast fission of at least the uranium and plutonium
isotopes—there are extensions of the signal comparison approach that can occur at
the fine-grained modeling level which would not necessarily offer any refinement of
these results, but lay the groundwork for the measurement of finer details regarding
core state.
The focus of this work has been analysis of the reaction rate differences between
reference and perturbed cores which have yielded to a malicious actor a weaponiz-
able quantity of plutonium. The core of a nuclear reactor is, in every sense of the
term, a non-linear system with a staggering number of feedback mechanisms span-
ning at least a few dimensions. That truth guided the simulated measurement of
the core as a gestalt object even as perturbations to it accounted for a finer struc-
ture, and since the counting statistics of current-generation antineutrino detectors are
quite low, meaningful differences in core state can currently only be measured on the
core-level. Should the application of near-field antineutrino detectors for safeguards
proceed toward large-scale implementation, the entire space of possible diversions will
require mapping. Separation of the difference from reference antineutrino signal into
components based on the composition of the altered assemblies and those resulting
from the altered neutron flux in unperturbed assemblies would provide guidance into
many types of multiple-assembly diversion scenarios.
The restriction to single-assembly diversions with no shuffling was made in order
to limit the permutations of core perturbations to infinite in only the dimension of
replacement assembly enrichment. Diversion scenarios in which removals are masked
by shuffling fuel around, multiple highly-differing assemblies are removed and their
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plutonium content combined during reprocessing, etc., are all viable paths a prolifer-
ator might take if given the chance. While changing particular parts of the core and
measuring the whole-core effect gives insight into the strengths and weaknesses of
the technology and informs us about how the technology might be applied to protect
against certain eventualities, the library of possible real-world diversion scenarios
is vast and if a signal comparison approach to antineutrino safeguards is adopted
in practice, modeling a great number complex scenarios to determine the minimum
spanning set and which types of diversions resemble each other is a necessary block
in the foundation of antineutrino safeguards.
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